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Future professionals should be prepared for scientific reasoning, i.e., to construct and apply 
scientific knowledge, in order to analyze and solve problems in their professional practice. 
Yet, future practitioners’ scientific reasoning skills often seem to be deficient when solving 
practical problems. This dissertation explores to what extent collaboration may foster the 
engagement of future practitioners in scientific reasoning: i.e., in epistemic processes (e.g., 
hypothesizing, evaluating evidence) and in referring to scientific content knowledge (e.g., 
scientific theories and evidence). Therefore, two studies were conducted to compare 
collaborative and individual problem solving of pre-service teachers regarding their scientific 
reasoning. Study 1 investigates the effect of group heterogeneity with respect to problem 
solving scripts on scientific reasoning. Study 2 explores to what extent Epistemic Network 
Analysis can serve as a methodological approach for measuring scientific reasoning. As part 
of Study 1, pre-service teachers solved an educational problem either as individuals (N=16) or 
as pairs (N=30 pairs). Collaboration showed a mixed effect on scientific reasoning processes: 
pairs engaged more in explaining and reasoning about the problem and drew more 
conclusions, while individuals engaged more in generating solutions. Additional analyses 
showed that the more heterogeneous pairs were regarding their members’ problem solving 
scripts the more they engaged in hypothesizing and evaluating evidence and the less they 
engaged in generating solutions. Finally, pairs less often referred to scientific content than 
individuals did during problem solving. Study 2 further analyzed the data by applying 
Epistemic Network Analysis. This method has the advantage of analyzing patterns of 
connections between epistemic processes, i.e., epistemic networks of scientific reasoning. The 
central epistemic process for pairs was evidence evaluation, which they frequently used in 






most characteristic process in individuals’ scientific reasoning was solution generation, which 
very often co-occurred with hypothesizing and evidence evaluation. The overall results 
indicate that if the aim is to develop a more reflective understanding of the problem, future 
practitioners should collaborate with each other, especially in heterogeneous settings. 
However, they should be supported (1) to share knowledge regarding scientific theories and 
evidence as well as (2) to reach a mutual understanding (e.g., by coordinating explanations) 
on the problem after a certain time so as to be able to have the capacity of generating 
solutions. Moreover, the different effects of collaboration on the process and content aspects 
of scientific reasoning imply that scientific reasoning might not be a unidimensional 
construct, and its process and content levels should be differentiated in future research. A 
further important methodological implication is that the process aspect of scientific reasoning 
can be analyzed as a network of interconnected skills and such analysis might bring more 
explanatory value than the mere reliance on frequencies of occurrences of isolated activities.  
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1. Problem statement 
Not only for scientists it is essential to know how to construct and apply valid knowledge in a 
reliable manner in order to examine and solve problems in the context of their professional 
practice. For – partly or even predominantly – practice-oriented professions such as medicine 
(Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996), business (Stark, Gruber, Mandl, & 
Hinkofer, 2001) or teaching  it is also important that practitioners know how to utilize 
relevant knowledge, so as their professional decisions follow a systematic reasoning process 
and are made on reliable evidence. This means that when they solve problems in their 
practice, practitioners should know how to reason scientifically, i.e., to (1) engage in problem 
solving in a systematic way analogous to scientific reasoning (Fischer et al., 2014); and (2) 
use adequate scientific sources (e.g., theoretical constructs or research findings) from their 
domain (e.g., Spencer, Detrich, & Slocum, 2012). For example, doctors solve diagnostic 
problems on a daily basis (Charlin, Boshuizen, Custers, & Feltovich, 2007). In order to cure 
their patients they should (1) systematically collect information (e.g., from the patient and 
from medical records or by initiating further investigations) so as to test plausible hypotheses 
(e.g., about illnesses) as well as (2) apply their academic knowledge (e.g., about diseases) in 
order to be able to professionally explain and alleviate the patients’ problem. To give another 
example, a teacher might notice that one or more of her pupils underperforms on a test. This 
teacher should be able to critically reflect on this phenomenon, in an evidence-based manner 
(Robinson, 1998; Spencer et al., 2012; Voss, Kunter, & Baumert, 2011). This means that first, 
the teacher should be capable of engaging in certain problem solving or reasoning processes 
(e.g., identifying the problem, evaluating her own assumptions). Second, she should refer to 
theoretical knowledge on learning and instruction (e.g., considering cognitive, emotional, 






need to relate that knowledge to empirical findings (e.g., research on epistemic motives or 
learning strategies). While solving problems as scientifically knowledgeable practitioners 
(i.e., reasoning scientifically; Fischer et al., 2014) is generally part of the curricula in higher 
education (similarly, in teacher education), the difficulties of utilizing scientific reasoning 
skills for solving complex practice-related problems is a frequently reported issue (Gräsel & 
Mandl, 1993; Gruber, Mandl, & Renkl, 2000). For example, medical students often show 
problems to transfer the knowledge they have learnt in the university context (i.e., at lectures) 
to professionally engage in diagnostic problem solving (Gräsel & Mandl, 1993). Similarly, 
teachers often seem to rely to a limited extent on scientific resources when handling 
professional problems (Hetmanek et al., 2015), and they often seem to show difficulties in 
using evidence to assess learning and instruction (Morris, 2006; Yeh & Santagata, 2015). 
 This dissertation argues that one possibility to engage future practitioners in scientific 
reasoning while solving professional problems is to ask them to solve such problems 
collaboratively during their academic training (Baeten & Simons, 2016; Noroozi, Teasley, 
Biemans, Weinberger, & Mulder, 2013; Rummel & Spada, 2005) rather than to deal with 
them alone. Collaboration can be seen an authentic context of scientific reasoning and 
argumentation (Osborne, 2010; Simon, Langley, & Bradshaw, 1981) and, therefore, 
collaborative reasoning (e.g., solving problem in pairs) might “naturally” trigger an 
engagement in scientific reasoning compared to individual reasoning that may be a less 
natural setting for reasoning scientifically. The main assumption behind engaging future 
professionals more often in collaborative problem solving practices during their academic 
training is that it could offer them the opportunity to learn (1) how to solve problems 
professionally (i.e., in a science-based manner) and (2) content knowledge in a more authentic 






these knowledge to their future professional problem solving practice (Hmelo-Silver, 2004; 
Stark, Gruber, Mandl, & Renkl, 1998). To engage future practitioners in collaboration so as it 
is beneficial for their scientific reasoning, it should also be considered, however, that there are 
factors reported to facilitate or hinder group productivity (Hill, 1982; Hirst & Echterhoff, 
2012; Noroozi et al., 2013; Paulus, 2000). These factors might, similarly, have an impact on 
practitioners’ engagement in scientific reasoning during collaboration. One can account for 
many of these by giving further instructional support (e.g., Mullins, Rummel, & Spada, 2011; 
e.g., Noroozi et al., 2013), while there are only some that one may consider without 
necessarily giving further instructions. Since the scope of this dissertation is to investigate the 
impact of collaboration on scientific reasoning without further instructional support, it seems 
reasonable to set a focus on factors that reasoners bring to the problem solving context and 
that might have an impact on whether collaboration may be a beneficial learning context for 
learning how to reason scientifically. Prior knowledge might be an ideal candidate for such 
purpose, because it is shown to affect reasoning processes (Shapiro, 2004; Stark, Puhl, & 
Krause, 2009). To give an example, if one is planning to optimize collaboration between 
future practitioners, she can create a group of reasoning partners who are, for example, more 
or less diverse in their prior knowledge. Group diversity (e.g., based on prior knowledge) is 
widely cited among those factors that may influence collaborative reasoning (Bowers, 
Pharmer, & Salas, 2000; Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Noroozi et al., 2005; Paulus, 2000; Rummel 
& Spada, 2005). Therefore, it is an interesting question to further investigate whether a certain 
type of prior knowledge can be identified to affect practitioners’ engagement in collaborative 
scientific reasoning. For example, collaborative partners’ diverse approaches on problem 
solving, i.e., the heterogeneity of their “problem solving scripts” (Fischer, Kollar, Stegmann, 






reasoning. Although there is an empirical need to explore how such scripts may influence 
reasoning processes (Vogel, Wecker, Kollar, & Fischer, 2016), there seems to be a research 
gap in this area. Therefore, it is a further aim of this dissertation to explore a potential impact 
of the heterogeneity of groups regarding their problem solving scripts on their engagement in 
collaborative scientific reasoning.   
 Furthermore, to find valid answers regarding the earlier argument that collaboration 
might be a more authentic context and, therefore, more advantageous to scientific reasoning 
compared to individual reasoning; selecting the appropriate methodological approach is 
important. Such a method should offer interpretable and comparable representations of 
scientific reasoning processes of collaborating partners as well as of individuals. Authors 
often propose that scientific reasoning is a complex process (e.g., Osborne, 2010) that can be 
measured through different subskills or processes (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Fischer et al., 
2013; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Yet, beyond theoretical proposals for such processes (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 2013) there is a lack of methodological framework on measuring scientific 
reasoning in a conclusive manner. As a result, studies often apply “coding and counting” 
methods (Okada & Simon, 1997) and measure scientific reasoning processes in an “isolated” 
manner without being able to draw valid conclusions about the overall process of scientific 
reasoning. Therefore, a further aim of this dissertation is to find a methodological framework 
that accounts for individual processes contributing to scientific reasoning and, at the same 
time, allows conclusive interpretations regarding scientific reasoning. 
 To sum up, the main aim of this dissertation is to investigate the question whether 
collaboration might be an effective way to deal with the problem of future professionals’ 
suboptimal engagement in scientific reasoning. In this respect, the following work 






collaborative scientific reasoning; and (2) what could be an optimal methodological approach 
to assess scientific reasoning while comparing groups with individuals. For the proper 
investigation of these questions, further specification on what constitutes scientific reasoning 
is necessary. Therefore, the next chapter (Chapter 2) is concerned with the conceptualization 
of scientific reasoning in its relation to practitioners’ problem solving. The subsequent chapter 
(Chapter 3) addresses the main question of the study, i.e., how a collaborative context may 
affect scientific reasoning, and discusses theoretical and empirical sources to find existing 
answers to that question. The chapters afterwards consider the two sub-problems related to the 
main question of this work: (1) the group composition problem (Chapter 4) and (2) the 
measurement problem (Chapter 5-6). After setting the research questions (Chapter 7) for 
further inquiry, two empirical studies are introduced to find answers to the main question on 
the effect of collaboration (Chapter 8) as well as on the sub-questions on group-composition 
(Chapter 8) and on measurement (Chapter 9). Finally, the last chapters (Chapter 10-11) 
inspect the generalizability and the limitations of the empirical findings reported in the earlier 















2. Scientific reasoning 
In order to answer the main question of this dissertation whether collaboration can be a 
beneficial context to engage future practitioners in scientific reasoning while they solve 
problems relevant for their future practice, a conceptual framework on scientific reasoning is 
necessary. Therefore, in the following, a theoretical framework is introduced in three steps. 
First, a short review will investigate the commonalities and the distinctive features between 
scientific reasoning and problem solving; so as to clarify if the conceptual differentiation 
between scientific reasoning and problem solving can be warranted (Chapter 2.1). The 
subchapter afterwards argues how scientific reasoning is relevant for solving professional 
problems in practice (Chapter 2.2). The subsequent subchapters (Chapter 2.3-2.5) introduce a 
two-dimensional framework on scientific reasoning. Finally, a review of empirical literature 
investigates to what extent professionals solve problems as scientifically knowledgeable 
practitioners (Chapter 2.6). If practitioners show difficulties with engaging in scientific 
reasoning, this might serve as an argument to investigate further whether implementing 
collaboration for problem solving may foster practitioners’ scientific reasoning.   
2.1. Scientific reasoning and problem solving  
From early on there has been a line of research that understands scientific reasoning as a 
process of (heuristic) discovery and inference-making in order to solve a problem (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; Simon et al., 1981; Zimmerman, 2000). Moreover, as such inquiry-based 
inference-making does not always have to be systematic and it can be analogous to general 
problem solving activity (Siegler, 1978; Simon, 1989). According to this “science-as-
problem-solving view” (Klahr & Dunbar, 1989) scientific reasoning can be understood as a 
way of complex problem solving (Klahr & Simon, 1999) and, taken that view, scientific 






2000). What differences and what commonalities do they have then? As Simon et al. (1981) 
argues there are two distinct features that may be more the characteristics of scientific 
reasoning than of general problem solving, such as (1) the social nature and (2) the occasional 
goal-indefiniteness. The first one refers to that scientists often solve problems in collaboration 
over a longer period of time (Archer et al., 2010; Dunbar, 1995). The latter distinction refers 
to those occasions when the goals are not yet from the beginning of discovery clearly 
identifiable for scientists, compared to those typical problem solving scenarios where a clearly 
defined end-state exists. Besides these differences, the authors argue, scientific inquiry might 
consist of processes that “are not qualitatively distinct” from solving non-scientific problems. 
For those processes they propose data gathering, finding parsimonious descriptions and 
developing explanatory theories as well as the invention of new instruments or methods of 
observation. Theory development and contrasting it to evidence are indeed from early on and 
rather widely considered as central to both scientific reasoning and problem solving (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; Kuhn, 1989; Sandoval, Sodian, Koerber, & Wong, 2014). As Kuhn (1989) 
argues in her review that while the skills of theory development, identification of relevant 
evidence and drawing appropriate conclusions based on that evidence might not capture all 
features of scientific reasoning, they are “the most central, essential and general skills” in 
reasoning scientifically (p. 674).  
 From this short theoretical introduction it seems reasonable to conclude that (1) 
general problem solving and scientific reasoning share similar features and that (2) some of 
these features, e.g., hypothesizing (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) evaluating evidence (Kuhn, 1989) 
and engaging in a social negotiation process (Archer et al., 2010; Simon et al., 1981) might be 
more “core” to scientific reasoning (while these distinctive features can still occur in the 






in order to point out the relevance of scientific reasoning for practitioners’ problem solving, 
suggesting that the quality of practitioners’ general problem solving might be indicated by the 
extent to which they engage in such processes that are also relevant or, as just mentioned, 
“core” epistemic processes for scientists (Fischer et al., 2014; Madsen & Olson, 2005; Sackett 
et al., 1996; Spencer et al., 2012). 
2.2. The “scientifically knowledgeable practitioner” 
It is arguable that a professional way to solve problems is to entertain a systematic process of 
reasoning, meaning to engage in certain epistemic processes that allow using and generating 
(profession-relevant) knowledge in order to solve a problem. Klahr and Simon (1999) note 
that in that respect scientists and practitioners “share the same general approach to solving 
their respective problems, and they use the same weak methods” (p. 540). By “weak” they 
refer to heuristic or cross-domain applicable methods rather than “not good enough” ways to 
solve a problem. Most certainly, an important and existing counter-argument is that 
professional problem-solving is not independent from specialized expertise in a given domain, 
meaning that the quality of problem solving would emerge from expertise in that domain 
instead of domain-independent problem solving heuristics (Anderson, 1987; Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Ericsson, 2006; Gilhooly, 1990; Hmelo-Silver, Marathe, & Liu, 2007). Yet, 
there are studies that suggest that expertise may not always have a positive effect on 
professional problem solving (e.g., Stark et al., 1998). Nevertheless, this dissertation is 
seeking to identify some domain-general features or even “heuristics” that, regardless of the 
domain, can be fruitfully applied, e.g., coordinating hypotheses with evidence (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; Kuhn, 1989; Sandoval et al., 2014). In other words, following the idea of 






relevance for solving problems in different practice-oriented domains, because they capture 
general epistemic, and therefore, rather domain-independent characteristics, of reasoning.  
 Following the earlier thought, Simon (1989), for example, specifies “typical” 
processes scientists engage in: e.g., forming problems or asking questions, drawing 
inferences, testing these inferences or inventing new instruments for observation. Most 
importantly, he adds that “What is common to all of these tasks is that they appear to employ 
the same general kinds of problem solving processes as are employed […] by physicians 
making diagnoses, by computer salesmen configuring systems for clients, by architects 
designing houses”. This insightful observation supports the point of the present work, namely 
that the epistemic processes scientists engage in or the way practitioners solve problems might 
share epistemic commonalities. Further authors suggest that while solving problems 
practitioners, just like scientists, should be able to identify and analyze the problem at hand 
(Robinson, 1998; Weinstock, 2009), set up questions to investigate further (Hou, Sung, & 
Chang, 2009), generate assumptions or hypotheses about the problem (Charlin et al., 2007) 
develop artefacts (Dennen & Hoadley, 2013), rely on evidence (Spencer et al., 2012), evaluate 
that evidence (Morris, 2006) in order to come up with a conclusion (Rummel & Spada, 2005) 
and communicate the problem solving process across their peers (Nokes, Bullough Jr, Egan, 
Birrell, & Merrell Hansen, 2008). 
 Fischer et al. (2014) suggests a similar, yet, wider perspective when interpreting the 
relationship between scientific inquiry and practice-oriented problem solving by introducing 
the concept of “epistemic modes”. According to their framework, scientific reasoning can 
follow different (epistemic) motives and, correspondingly, might occur in different epistemic 
modes. They propose three epistemic modes of scientific reasoning by building on the 






building mode; an artefact-centered mode and a practice-oriented mode. The last one, the 
practice-oriented mode of scientific reasoning is characterized by solution development for 
problems that are contextualized in the professional practice. While solving the problem, the 
“scientifically knowledgeable practitioner” will, similarly to scientists, rely on “scientific 
concepts, theories and methods” (Fischer et al., 2014, p. 5). Finally, Fischer et al. (2014) 
makes a clear distinction between solving problems as an instance of scientific reasoning (or 
“science-based reasoning in practice”, as they call, p. 6) and general problem solving is that 
while general problem solving has a main concern of finding a solution to the problem, 
scientific reasoning should additionally result in an “argument”. Although at this point the 
authors (Fischer et al., 2014) do not explicitly specify what they mean under “argument” as a 
result, yet, based on their line of reasoning, they seem to understand that the science-based 
practitioner, compared to the general problem solver, 1) engages in processes of knowledge 
construction and at the same time 2) relies on scientific knowledge such as “concepts, theories 
and methods” (Fischer et al., 2014, p. 6).  
 To summarize, there are similarities between scientific reasoning and solving 
problems in practice regarding the processes that general problem solvers and scientists or 
“science-based practicioners” engage in (Klahr & Dunbar, 1989; Klahr & Simon, 1999; 
Simon, Klahr, & Kotovsky, 1989). Yet, beyond these heuristic similarities between scientific 
reasoning and problem solving, scientific reasoning might potentially be characterized by a 
greater extent of socially exchanging ideas (Rummel & Spada, 2005; Osborne, 2010; Simon 
et al., 1981), developing hypotheses (Charlin et al., 2007; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988), evaluating 
those hypotheses in light of evidence (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; D. Kuhn, 1989; Simon et al., 
1981) as well as using scientific knowledge in forms of e.g., theories and evidence (Fischer et 






scientific reasoning composed of? In the following, this dissertation is seeking to find a more 
conclusive answer to these questions than it has reached so far.   
2.3. Scientific Reasoning 
What is scientific reasoning? Although different interpretations are available on what 
constitutes scientific reasoning (Engelmann, Neuhaus, & Fischer, 2016; Fischer et al., 2014; 
Zimmerman, 2000), there is also a reasonable convergence in research as conceptualizations 
point to some identifiable directions as follows. Generally speaking, scientific reasoning is 
often understood as a complex skill or set of skills that affords knowledge construction in a 
systematic scientist-like manner (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Fischer et al., 2014) Osborne, 
2010). As some authors (David Klahr & Dunbar, 1989; Zimmerman, 2000) point out, at least 
two main strands of research can be differentiated for investigating scientific reasoning: the 
abovementioned (1) problem solving approach and a (2) concept formation approach. As 
earlier discussed, the first one reflects on how reasoners solve problems (e.g., Okada & 
Simon, 1997; Rummel & Spada, 2005) while the second one reflects on the development in 
reasoners’ understanding and use of different (e.g., scientific) concepts (e.g., Hmelo-Silver et 
al., 2007). Beyond these two main approaches, other authors (e.g., Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; 
Sandoval, 2005; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004) emphasize a further, an (3) epistemic dimension 
by arguing for the relevance of epistemologies in scientific reasoning (i.e., how scientific 
knowledge is created and used). This latter view is also close to a “nature of science” 
conceptualization of scientific reasoning (Engelmann et al., 2016, Koenig, Schen, & Bao, 
2012) 
 Simon and Lea (1974) discussed an already existing division in the psychology 
literature between problem solving and concept attainment and made an attempt to bring these 






that can also model reasoning processes in this respect, including e.g., heuristic search. 
Continuing the attempt of reducing the division between the problem solving and the concept 
development approaches Klahr and Dunbar (1988) created an integrated framework for 
scientific reasoning. As one important conclusion of this attempt, Dunbar and Klahr (1989) 
stressed that both concept formation and problem solving tasks might involve similar 
cognitive or reasoning processes such as hypothesizing and experimenting. Similarly to these 
exemplary attempts, the interpretation of this work regarding scientific reasoning aims to 
connect the diverging research traditions and considers all the three approaches described 
above: the problem solving view, the conceptual approach and the epistemic view. First, this 
dissertation argues that driven by an epistemic aim to e.g., better understand a problem, one 
will engage in scientific reasoning processes (e.g., she will generate evidence in order to test a 
hypothesis). Second, this work considers that one’s reasoning can prove to show different 
epistemic qualities (e.g., considering the source of evidence to be used to test a hypothesis). 
More specifically, the present dissertation understands scientific reasoning as an epistemic 
pursuit of applying and gathering (scientific or everyday) knowledge in order to solve 
(scientific or everyday) problems. For the sake of conceptual clarity, however, in the 
following, this work keeps a distinction between the “problem solving”, i.e., the process 
aspect and the “knowledge application”, i.e., the content aspect of scientific reasoning. While 
it is argued that both of these aspects are relevant for scientific reasoning, the present work 
considers them as orthogonal, yet, complimentary dimensions that describe different qualities 
or features of scientific reasoning and should be simultaneously taken into account. 
 As a visual summary, Figure 1 depicts the theoretical conceptualization on scientific 














Figure 1. The perspective of this dissertation on scientific reasoning 
2.4. Scientific reasoning processes  
To follow the above introduced definition, it can be argued that regarding the process aspect 
scientific reasoning is an epistemic pursuit to solve a problem as well as to gather knowledge 
on the way which can support that problem solving process. This part of the conceptualization 
stems from the “science-as-problem-solving” and the inquiry-oriented approaches (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Simon et al., 1989) as from this perspective this work 
views scientific reasoning as a systematic engagement in epistemic processes of scientific 
inquiry (Fischer et al., 2014). Along this theoretical and empirical tradition different epistemic 
processes have been identified to play a role in scientific reasoning and inquiry (de Jong, 
2006; Fischer et al., 2014; White & Frederiksen, 1998). Simon (1989), for example, lists some 
processes scientists might typically engage in such as formulating problems, drawing 
inferences from theories, testing such inferences, designing experiments, explaining and 
generalizing outcomes, inventing new instruments for observation and so forth. These 






constructing a problem space (Weinberger & Fischer, 2006), questioning (Kuhn & Dean, 
2005; White & Frederiksen, 1998), hypothesizing (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Lawson, 2002), 
generating evidence for hypothesis testing (Schauble, Glaser, Raghavan, & Reiner, 1991) and 
evaluating evidence (Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011; Sandoval et al., 2014). Fischer et al., 
(2014) proposed a framework for scientific reasoning and their model collects eight epistemic 
processes of scientific reasoning. The Fischer et al. (2014) model encompasses those 
processes that are reported across different theoretical or empirical strands of research, and in 
this respect it can serve as a useful framework for further (empirical) application. In the 
following, the present work introduces the model, i.e., the epistemic processes of scientific 
inquiry. 
2.4.1. Problem identification  
To start reasoning about a problem, the problem solver needs to realize that there is a problem 
to solve. As Fischer et al., (2014) describes: “During this epistemic activity, a problem 
representation is built from an analysis of the situation.” (p. 5). There are similar 
operationalizations of problem identification. For example, (Weinberger & Fischer, 2006) 
argues for the epistemic process of “Construction of problem space” which is an early stage of 
problem solving when reasoners analyze the problem case “with the aim to foster 
understanding of the problem” (p. 74). Such initial understanding of the problem is essential 
to engage in further valid reasoning processes. Research on problem solving from early on has 
recognized that an initial step of the problem solving process is to build a (mental) 
representation or an understanding on what constitutes the problem (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 
1981; Hinsley, Hayes & Simon; Simon & Newell, 1971). More recent studies on problem 
solving applying neuroimaging techniques also argue for the idea that there might be a 






Malhotra, 2002; Kuhn & Dean, 2005; Simon et al., 1989; White & Frederiksen, 1998) which 
can be labeled as an “encoding” of the problem.  
2.4.2. Questioning  
As Fischer et al. (2014) proposes, based on the problem representation initial questions are 
developed that aim to move further reasoning processes forward. Besides problem 
identification, questioning is often emphasized as another critical initial step of scientific 
inquiry (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Kuhn & Dean, 2005; Simon et al., 1989; White & 
Frederiksen, 1998). White and Frederiksen (1998), for example, understands questioning as 
relevant in setting directions for further predictions that will eventually lead to better 
understanding of a topic of interest (which can be e.g., the problem itself). Kuhn and Dean 
(2005) argue that this stage of scientific inquiry can be critical for subsequent reasoning, as 
for example, “because it organizes and gives meaning to the activity that follows” (p. 869). 
For example, a teacher facing a problem of very heterogeneous performance of her students 
might ask herself why that is so. This will potentially lead her to develop some plausible 
explanations of that problem and she may collect further information (about the students or 
about the class) in order to draw more valid conclusions.   
2.4.3. Hypothesis generation 
Hypothesizing, developing investigable explanations or, in general, engaging in hypothetico-
deductive reasoning is considered as a core epistemic process of scientific reasoning (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988; de Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998; Lawson, 2005; Okada & Simon, 1997; White 
& Frederiksen, 1998). During this epistemic process, following the specification of Fischer et 
al. (2014), reasoners “derive possible answers to the question” (p. 6). This means, that 
hypothesis generation can be viewed as a coherent part of the inquiry cycle stemming from 






subsequent processes of evidence generation evaluation of this evidence in the relation of 
hypotheses. Such hypotheses can provide candidate explanations for and serve as a mean to 
better understand the original problem. For example, a physician listening to a patient’s 
symptoms develop an immediate hypothesis about plausible illnesses which will also direct 
her further investigation in order to be able to set a proper diagnosis (Charlin et al., 2007). It 
may be important, however, to mention that the process of hypothesis generation may not 
only precede further information collection (i.e., evidence generation), therefore this “a priori” 
way of developing hypotheses is not exclusive for scientific reasoning. In addition to that, 
hypothesis generation can happen “a posteriori” as new hypotheses can be derived from 
evidence or even existing ones can be revised this way. Klahr & Dunbar (1988), for example, 
claims that hypotheses can be generated in two ways: based on prior knowledge as well as a 
generalization from evidence generation. Similarly, de Jong and van Joolingen (1998) argue 
for generating “a posteriori” hypotheses, i.e., that also disconfirming evidence should lead to 
hypotheses generation by revising one’s initial (theoretical) assumptions. For instance, if a 
teacher initially believes that her pupil’s performance is low due to lack of engagement, yet, 
the teacher learns that the pupil does invest in learning, then the teacher might want to revise 
her initial explanation of the problem and may try to develop new assumptions.  
2.4.4. Constructing artefacts 
According to Fischer et al. (2014) scientific reasoning often includes the development of a 
sort of artefact. The process of constructing an artefact is scientific in a sense that it 
incorporates scientific knowledge and is aimed to improve scientific reasoning (e.g., to 
alleviate the problem). This artefact may be physical or related to a physical system, for 
example, a teacher may want to construct a test following methodological and theoretical 






students’ understanding on a topic. This test as an exemplary artefact is optimally not only 
constructed by scientific knowledge (i.e., methodological and theoretical) principles, but it 
contributes to knowledge construction and engagement in further inquiry processes: it can 
provide evidence for evaluation that may lead to further hypothesis generation processes and 
so forth. Or to give another example, Fischer et al., (2014) mentions a prototype of a learning 
environment that follows the guidelines of theoretical design principles and potentially on 
earlier empirical evidence. However, such an artefact does not necessarily have to reach the 
stage where it is materialized. In fact, from the definition of Fischer et al. (2014), it might 
follow that it is the scientifically reasoned (i.e., principle-based) construction itself as well as 
the reasoning processes that the construction might lead to which can be considered as the 
scientific aspects of artefact construction and not the materialized outcome. Following the 
example of Fischer et al. (2014) on a learning environment based on design principles, it 
might matter less whether the teacher has managed to create e.g., an online learning 
environment. What matters is whether a plan of the environment is being constructed based 
on specific design principles  (e.g., Dennen & Hoadley, 2013) and similarly, if the plan of 
such an environment allows further hypothetical or “what if” thinking processes even in case 
of the lack of available evidence (see e.g., conceptual simulation at Trickett & Trafton, 2007).  
2.4.5. Generating evidence 
Besides hypothesis generation, generating evidence is another epistemic process typically 
viewed as core to scientific reasoning (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Okada & Simon, 1997; 
Schauble et al., 1991).Yet, most of the aspects of generating evidence are indicated to be not 
expertise-dependent (e.g., planning and conducting systematic evidence collection; Schunn & 
Anderson, 1999) and therefore, this epistemic process can be considered also as a potential 






example, can take form from everyday information seeking such as searching on the web 
(Goldman, Braasch, Wiley, Graesser, & Brodowinska, 2012; Lazonder, 2005) to controlled 
experimentation (Kuhn & Dean, 2005; White & Frederiksen, 1998). In a rather general way, it 
can mean to use or refer to any (scientific or everyday) information while reasoning (e.g., 
Hetmanek et al., 2015). For example, a teacher interested in how to increase her students’ 
motivation might look for recent empirical findings on how to improve her methods in order 
to engage students. In this respect, evidence generation, the skill to search for, to find and to 
rely on evidence is a crucial process to work as an evidence-based or scientifically 
knowledgeable practitioner (Fischer et al., 2014; Hetmanek et al., 2015; Spencer et al., 2012). 
2.4.6. Evaluating evidence 
Evidence evaluation can be understood as the coordination between a hypothesis (or 
hypotheses) and the available evidence (Klahr et al., 2011; Kuhn, 2001, 2002; Sandoval et al., 
2014). This epistemic process is mainly concerned with if the available evidence is in 
accordance with the initial assumptions (i.e. hypotheses) or if those assumptions should be 
revised due to the contradicting evidence. Another conception of evaluating evidence can be 
to assess the merits of the evidence-to-be-used. This form of evidence evaluation may involve 
some epistemic criteria regarding e.g., how evidence should be generated (Chinn & Malhotra, 
2002; Sandoval et al., 2014). To give an example, a student may underperform in a subject 
but she may gain very good grades in other subjects. In this case, the teacher may be aware of 
the limitations that the evidence (student’s low grade in one class) is generated under specific 
circumstances (e.g., a student underperforms only in that class but not in other classes). 
Consequently, the teacher would not use the evidence of underperformance to support an 
assumption of the students’ general motivation or capabilities. This epistemic understanding 






(e.g., Koenig et al., 2012) in order to select appropriate (e.g., the “best available evidence”; 
Spencer et al., 2012) to support their decision-making and problem solving processes.  
2.4.7. Drawing conclusions 
Drawing conclusions is an epistemic process that has a focus on coordinating and assessing 
earlier inquiry processes and outcomes. Yet, it means more than a coordination process 
between two epistemic processes such as hypothesis generation and evidence evaluation 
which is in the focus of evidence evaluation (Sandoval et al., 2014). Drawing conclusions is a 
more complex epistemic process in a sense that it has a more conclusive assessment-focus 
than, for example, evidence evaluation. According to Fischer et al. (2014) it often includes the 
integration of different evidences by taking into account the methods by which these 
evidences were generated as well as the epistemic criteria of the discipline(s) involved so as to 
conclude something about e.g., the applicability of an artefact such as a learning environment 
or the characteristics of the original problem. For example, when summarizing a diagnosis 
collaborating professionals might evaluate the information they know about a patient in the 
light of reliable diagnostic criteria, judge the likelihood of certain types of illnesses and take 
into account potential therapy plans at the same time (e.g., Rummel & Spada, 2005). While 
doing so they consider (and may articulate) the outcomes of earlier epistemic processes.   
2.4.8. Communicating and scrutinizing 
Scientific reasoning often happens in a collaborative context (Sampson & Clark, 2008) 
(Osborne, 2010). As Simon et al., (1981) argues, one distinctive feature of scientific reasoning 
in comparison to problem solving is that “scientific inquiry is a social process, often involving 
many scientists and often extending over long periods of time” (p. 1). Communicating 
concerns or outcomes of the reasoning processes can be considered as a “wheel” to improve 






collaboration, a key role of communicating and scrutinizing is that it may initiate “a chain of 
reasoning that can then result in a reconceptualization of a theory, data, or experimental 
design” (p. 14). For example, while exchanging knowledge, partners often develop deeper 
understanding of the original problem (Michelene T. H. Chi & Wylie, 2014; Roschelle & 
Teasley, 1995); generate alternative hypotheses (Okada & Simon, 1997), negotiate the 
interpretation of evidence (Osborne, 2010).  
 Practitioners also often need to engage in collaboration with each other, and often in 
an interdisciplinary way (Rummel & Spada, 2005). In such scenarios partners need to engage 
in productive talk in order to develop a similar representation of the problem, and to share all 
the necessary information in order to draw a valid conclusion. Studies from paired teaching 
(e.g., Nokes et al., 2008) suggest that although collaborating teaching practitioners may 
experience some difficulties e.g., when they need to coordinate their ideas to prepare for a 
class (Bullough et al., 2002); this negotiation between collaborating teachers is often 
beneficial as they learn from exchanging ideas (Baeten & Simons, 2014).  
2.5. Scientific reasoning as applying scientific content  
According to the definition of this work on scientific reasoning (see Chapter 2.3), reasoners 
can reason scientifically in two main aspects: (1) they can engage in epistemic processes of 
scientific reasoning (i.e., in epistemic processes as introduced above); and (2) they may apply 
knowledge acquired through scientific inquiry. The present work handles these two aspects as 
quasi-orthogonal in a sense that neither engaging in epistemic processes presupposes the use 
of scientific knowledge nor the use of scientific knowledge necessitates the engagement in 
epistemic processes.  
 To give an example for applying scientific content without engaging in epistemic 






her students are not engaged in class and their performance is also somewhat beyond her 
expectations. This teacher may attribute the problem to the students’ lack of motivation. 
Accordingly, she may apply motivational theories in order to engage her students. At the 
same time, she is not conducting further inquiry (e.g., developing alternative hypotheses or 
evaluating evidence) in order to investigate the problem further and in order to derive more 
valid solutions for it. To be more concrete, the teacher might consciously implement strategies 
to raise her students’ intrinsic motivation, e.g., via an increased sense of autonomy and 
competence (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2000). Yet, this teacher, by not engaging in epistemic inquiry 
processes, may miss more valid explanations of the problem, for example, her students may 
have suboptimal prior knowledge and this impedes with their sense-making processes as well 
as it results in their lack of engagement. Consequently, the teacher’s intervention may be less 
effective than one’s performance could potentially be who is engaging in scientific reasoning 
processes. On the other hand, developing naïve explanations without considering scientific 
content knowledge can also lead to problems. To follow the before-mentioned exemplary 
problem, the teacher can engage in a systematic way of inquiry. As such, she can develop 
different hypotheses about the problem, she can contrast those to evidence and might even 
find the most plausible one: e.g., the students might have problems with understanding the 
material. Yet, without having a theoretical understanding of learning processes she might 
choose inadequate instructional techniques (e.g., she cannot scaffold the students according to 
the level of their prior knowledge; Fischer et al., 2013). For example, she asks questions or 
provides clarifications that are for students who have very different conceptual understanding 
on the learning material, and thus, this teacher may induce an unnecessary cognitively load on 






 The examples mentioned above were intended to illustrate that both aspects of 
scientific reasoning (process and content) can work independently, yet, both might be 
necessary for working as a science-based practitioner and reaching justified conclusions from 
which valid solutions emerge. Therefore, in the following, this work continues the 
introduction with further clarification on the second aspect of scientific reasoning, i.e., the 
“knowledge application” or content aspect (see Chapter 2.3 and Figure 1) which can be 
considered, besides the process aspect, the other epistemic criterion for scientific reasoning.  
 This second aspect, the “knowledge application” aspect of scientific reasoning is only 
partially related to the conceptual development view on scientific reasoning (Zimmerman, 
2000). As opposed to that view, the present work is less interested how reasoners develop 
their understanding on a scientific concept such as external motivation, but it is more 
interested whether reasoners are able to apply that concept during problem solving. In this 
sense, the content aspect of scientific reasoning is somewhat closer to the line of research on 
“evidence-based practice” (Hetmanek et al., 2015; Mandinach, 2012; Sackett et al., 1996; 
Satterfield et al., 2009; Spencer et al., 2012; Wenglein et al., 2015).  
 The question about what knowledge evidence-based practice should include might 
yield somewhat different answers across domains (see e.g., Spencer et al., 2012) and even 
across researchers (see e.g., Robinson, 1998). Yet, in the studies on evidence-based practice 
there seems to be an overarching agreement that the practice of applying empirical evidence 
accumulated through systematic observation (e.g., research evidence or field observation) 
should be a part of such evidence-based approach (Hetmanek et al., 2015; Satterfield et al., 
2009; Spencer et al., 2012). According to this definition an evidence-based practitioner should 






 The present work builds on the understanding of evidence-based practice, yet, to a 
limited extent. This dissertation claims that applying any type of knowledge created through 
scientific inquiry (i.e., research evidence) should be considered as scientific reasoning (see 
Figure 1). Or to be more specific, it would fulfill the content-criteria of reasoning 
scientifically. This definition, however, works with somewhat different borders than the 
definition of evidence-based practice. First, it narrows the evidence-based practice view in 
some respect. Specifically, the present work proposes that although empirical evidence that 
does not result from “scientific inquiry” (e.g., the teacher’s observation of her students’ 
behavior) should not be considered under the view of applying scientific knowledge as an 
instance of scientific reasoning. In this respect, the understanding of the present work on what 
constitutes “evidence” as knowledge to be applied is narrower than the proposals from 
evidence-based practice (Sackett et al., 1996; Spencer et al., 2012). In another respect, 
however, the definition of this work also extends the evidence-based approach. By claiming 
“any type of knowledge it is meant, that it is not only applied empirical (e.g., research 
evidence) but also applied theoretical knowledge (scientific theories and related models) 
originating from scientific inquiry should be considered as instances of scientific reasoning. 
To conclude, the present work argues that the “knowledge application” aspect, i.e., applying 
empirical or theoretical scientific knowledge is a relevant criterion for reasoning scientifically 
as a practitioner.  
2.6. Do practitioners reason scientifically?  
The previous subchapters elaborated on the conceptual definition of this dissertation on 
scientific reasoning claiming that “scientifically knowledgeable practitioners” (Fischer et al., 
2014), similarly to scientists, also engage in systematic reasoning processes (Klahr & Simon, 






related problems (Rummel & Spada, 2005) However, to what extent does empirical evidence 
support that notion? To be more specific, are future practitioners as novice problem solvers 
able to demonstrate scientific reasoning skills (as a problem solving heuristics) so as they can 
be considered as “scientifically knowledgeable practitioners”?  
 As different sources of evidence seem to show, it may not always be the case. In their 
review, de Jong (2006) found that learners often have problems with hypothesis generation, 
evidence generation-evaluation and drawing conclusions. The authors’ main concern is that 
students are not systematic enough while engaging in such processes. For example, they do 
not use control of variable strategy, i.e., to change only one variable at a time so as to be able 
test its effect. Also, students often fall to confirmation bias, i.e., they seek for evidence that 
“supports” their initial hypotheses and argumentation, and therefore, miss or neglect evidence 
that contradicts to their assumptions. Clearly, such cognitive pitfall is in direct contradiction 
with the expectations of being evidence-based and to find the best available evidence 
regardless of motivational biases of the reasoner (e.g., Spencer et al., 2012).  
 Other studies further confirm the notion that coordinating hypotheses with evidence 
(e.g., making evidence-based decisions or revising the initial assumptions based on new 
evidence) is often problematic for university students (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Stark et al., 
2009) and even for teaching professionals (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Yeh & Santagata, 2015; 
van de Pol, Volman, & Beishuizen, 2011). Schunn and Andersson, (1999) for example, 
mentions that university students often do not use theories when planning evidence generation 
and they often rely on personal beliefs instead of evidence when drawing conclusions. In 
addition, Stark et al., (2009) reports that students often misinterpret evidence by not 
appropriately identifying the effect of a variable on another: e.g., they attribute the effect to 






misinterpretation of evidence and drawing invalid conclusions is also reported by studies that 
are concerned with teachers’ diagnostic errors (e.g., Wittwer, Nückles, & Renkl, 2010). While 
future teaching professionals need to estimate their students’ knowledge in order to plan their 
instructions accordingly (Pickthorne, 1983; Pol, Volman, Oort, & Beishuizen, 2014), 
empirical research shows that (future) teachers have difficulties in drawing valid evidence-
based conclusions (Chi, Siler, & Jeong, 2004; Morrison & Lederman, 2003; Yeh & Santagata, 
2015). Moreover, teachers’ invalid assumptions regarding their students’ performance as well 
as the difficulties teachers show when evaluating evidence in order to reconsider their initial 
assumptions, can lead to premature solutions to the educational problems teachers need to 
solve in their practice (e.g., Chi et al., 2004).     
 Besides the abovementioned, rather process-related challenges for future practitioners’ 
scientific reasoning, there are also content-related inaccuracies that often occur. For example, 
Stark et al. (2009) mentions that students often refer to own experiences instead of scientific 
theories or empirical findings and they show conceptual difficulties with scientific theories 
(e.g., by referring to the wrong theory or mistakenly referring to a theory). Similarly, other 
studies (Schunn & Anderson, 1999) also report it as an often upcoming problem that 
university students refer to personal opinion or “anecdotal” evidence instead of scientific 
theories or evidence. Further studies with teaching practitioners (Hetmanek et al., 2015) report 
similar issues, such as rarely using scientific resources when solving professional problems. 
In accordance with these findings, others (Morrison & Lederman, 2003) found that when 
teachers diagnose students’ understanding (e.g., preconceptions), they do not refer to 
scientific content such as “concept maps” or “writing prompts” (the examples are from the 
authors). There are other studies indicating that teachers may not appropriately consider 






(McElvany et al., 2012). Further research (Gruber et al., 2000; Stark et al., 1998) point to the 
problem of transferring knowledge from research to practice when solving complex 
professional problems.  
 All in all, from the empirical studies it is becoming visible that future practitioners 
often do not meet the criteria of a science-based practitioner (Fischer et al., 2014). They seem 
to have difficulties with engaging in scientific reasoning regarding both aspects of it: i.e., the 
process and the content aspects. Therefore, it seems reasonable to plan an “intervention” for 
fostering the engagement of future practitioners in scientific reasoning. Specifically, since 
scientific reasoning is arguably a social phenomenon, the present work investigates whether 
collaboration as a social context can be fruitfully applied to engage future practitioners in 
scientific reasoning, and therefore, to use collaboration in higher education to facilitate the 
acquisition of scientific reasoning skills. The assumption of this dissertation is that 
collaboration should be a way of educational intervention to engage in future practitioners in 
scientific reasoning. In order to see if such an assumption can be held to guide further 
empirical work; the upcoming chapter investigates to what extent this presumption can be 
justified. Therefore, the following chapter reviews the research on collaborative vs individual 











3. Collaborative (vs. Individual) Scientific Reasoning 
The present work argues that a collaborative context might facilitate both the process (i.e., 
engagement in epistemic processes) and content (application of scientific knowledge) aspects 
of scientific reasoning during practical problem solving. There are both theoretical and 
empirical reasons for this assumption and in the following this work takes a more detailed 
look at those in order to investigate why scientific reasoning should benefit from a 
collaborative setting.   
 First, for scientific reasoning collaboration may be a more authentic context than 
individual reasoning. Mercier & Sperber (2011) for example, claim that reasoning have 
evolved through communication with others and, consequently, gained an argumentative 
function to improve (both quantities and qualities of knowledge exchange across reasoners. In 
this sense reasoning has the social relevance of mediating information sharing process in 
groups and communities. Simon et al. (1981) while drawing a thin line of distinction between 
scientific reasoning and problem solving mention that one important difference between 
scientific reasoning and general problem solving is that “scientific inquiry is a social process” 
(Simon et al., 1981, p. 1). Similarly, Osborne (2010) argues that engaging in collaborative 
discourse and argumentation is a critical tool to develop scientific reasoning skills while it 
also facilitates conceptual understanding. Similarly, approaches of social constructivism 
emphasize the relevance of social interactions in reasoning and knowledge construction (see 
e.g., Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991/2002; Pea, 1993). This can 
mean that a professional-to-be can only engage in an optimal level of reasoning if she is 
engaging in collaboration in order to work on problems that are authentic for her future 
practice. Such engagement in authentic practices (and collaborative inquiry might be 






understanding about the processes and criteria of knowledge-building within a community 
(Chinn & Malhotra, 2002; Sampson & Clark, 2008). 
 Second, collaboration has communicational affordances (e.g., engaging in interactive 
discussions; Chi, 2009) that are claimed to be advantageous for scientific reasoning (Dunbar, 
1995; Osborne, 2010) as well as to general problem solving (Barron, 2000; Kirschner, Paas, 
Kirschner, & Janssen, 2011). Reasoning partners in a collaborative situation have the 
advantage to take into each other’s ideas and build their reasoning processes on each other’s 
contribution. Early research on collaborative vs. individual reasoning demonstrated how 
engaging in discourse can advance reasoning and problem solving (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983; 
Hill, 1982; Teasley, 1995) (Among the suggested mechanisms which can contribute to the 
advantage of collaborative reasoning, elaboration on one’s own contribution as well as on the 
partners’ contribution is typically identified (Kruger & Tomasello, 1986) (Berkowitz & 
Gibbs, 1983; Teasley, 1997). Such contributions can be part of a coordination process 
(Barron, 2000) where the aim of reasoners may be to develop and maintain a common 
understanding between each other (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1989; 
Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). Furthermore, interactive processes (Chi, 2009), e.g., elaborating 
on the partners’ ideas, are also characteristics of (collaborative) scientific discovery (Dunbar, 
1995; Okada & Simon, 1997). As Dunbar (1995) summarizes his observations about 
collaborative scientific work in laboratories, he points out the importance of such interactive 
reasoning for scientific inquiry. He mentions that scientists often face surprising results or 
other problems that engages them in interactive discussions which, as a result, often leads to a 
complete re-evaluation of the inquiry process: “often one person’s reasoning became the input 
to another person’s reasoning. This resulted in a rapid reconceptualization of problems and to 






 A third advantage of collaboration for scientific reasoning processes can be a cognitive 
advantage, i.e., the distribution of cognitive resources (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003; 
Hutchins, 1995; Pea, 1993). Such advantage can be important, because reasoning 
scientifically during solving problems might be cognitively demanding. Although some 
studies indicate that some reasoning processes, for example, problem identification, can 
happen even rather quickly and effortlessly (Anderson & Fincham, 2014; Hinsley et al., 1977) 
unless further sense-making processes (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995) are involved. Yet, further 
studies (Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Shehab & Nussbaum, 2015) demonstrates that 
inquiry processes can often be cognitively engaging beyond such a “quick and effortless” 
categorization process and novices often suffer from such cognitive load when engaging in 
solving problems based on inquiry (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011; Sweller, 1988). On the other 
hand, studies (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Kirschner, Paas, & Kirschner, 2009; 
Kirschner et al., 2011) propose that collaboration might be even beneficial for problem 
solving, because the group can function as an information processing system and as such there 
is a lower cognitive load imposed on its individual members. Collaborative reasoners can 
benefit from forming such cognitive system, because individual members can rely on each 
other’s cognitive resources distributing knowledge across each other (Hollingshead & 
Brandon, 2003; Noroozi et al., 2013) when engaging in potentially demanding tasks such as 
solving complex problems (e.g,, Kirschner et al., 2011).  
 While further empirical studies often support the notion that groups might perform 
better than average individuals do when engaging in problem solving and inquiry (e.g., 
Lazonder, 2005; Nokes-Malach, Richey, & Gadgil, 2015), other studies (Métrailler, Reijnen, 
Kneser, & Opwis, 2008; Sampson & Clark, 2009) also indicate that the results are not 






of group performance. These limitations influence whether collaboration can be brought to 
reach its potential (Kirschner et al., 2009; Nokes-Malach et al., 2015; Paulus, 2000). Thus, in 
order to engage in productive collaboration, reasoning partners often need to overcome certain 
difficulties (Rummel & Spada, 2005) such as communicational difficulties to establish and 
maintain a mutual understanding of the problem they are working on (Clark & Brennan, 1991; 
Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). Another problem might occur if collaborators converge their 
ideas too fast, and by doing so, they obstruct knowledge exchange. This may happen when 
group members excessively rely on what everyone seems to know in a group instead of 
discussing knowledge in depth or considering alternative, unique knowledge (Stasser & Titus, 
1985). Further factors (e.g., production blocking, cognitive load, social loafing, group size or 
evaluation apprehension etc. have been identified to account for such process losses 
moderating collaborative performance. Also, reviews (Nokes-Malach, Richey & Gadgil, 
2015) and meta-analyses (e.g., Vogel, Wecker, Kollar & Fischer, 2016) underscore the notion 
that groups might need further (e.g., instructional) support to reach their potential.    
 Still, besides the limitations introduced above, considering that the main concern of 
the present work is (a) scientific reasoning situated in (b) problem solving, the 
abovementioned three arguments (authentic context, communicational affordances, 
distributed cognition) seem to be robust enough to assume that establishing collaboration 
would be advantageous for future professionals and this advantage can be realized through 
both (a) scientific reasoning (Okada & Simon, 1997; Osborne, 2010; Simon et al., 1981; 







4. Group Composition Problem 
 Nevertheless, problem solving groups can be very different from another regarding 
their members’ demographic background (Curşeu & Pluut, 2013; Wegge, Roth, Neubach, 
Schmidt, & Kanfer, 2008); expertise (Noroozi et al., 2013; Wu, Liao, & Dai, 2015); prior 
knowledge (e.g., collaboration scripts; (Fischer et al., 2013) and so forth. This heterogeneity 
of group composition can have a significant impact on how groups collaborate, perform and 
jointly solve problems (Bowers et al., 2000; Canham, Wiley, & Mayer, 2012; Noroozi et al., 
2013; Rummel & Spada, 2005).  
 Indeed, future practitioners have diverse backgrounds and, in addition, they might 
show very different approaches on solving complex problems and whether and how they 
would engage in scientific reasoning while solving problems. For such individual problem 
solving approaches the term “problem-solving scripts” will be applied following the “script” 
terminology of Schank (1999) as well as its more recent interpretations e.g., on “collaboration 
scripts” (Fischer, Kollar, Stegmann & Wecker, 2013). In that respect, scripts or “internal 
scripts” (Kollar, Fischer, & Slotta, 2007) represent a form of procedural knowledge that guide 
a person’s understanding of and behavior in certain situations (Schank, 1999). Such scripts 
can contain knowledge about different aspects of a situation, most relevantly they tell what 
processes and in what possible sequence one might perform when entertaining a task such as 
solving a problem (Fischer et al., 2013). To be more specific here, problem solving scripts can 
be understood as a sort of “epistemic scripts” (Weinberger, Ertl, Fischer, & Mandl, 2005) as 
they represent an individuals’ knowledge about in what epistemic processes (e.g., hypothesis 
generation, evidence evaluation) and in what sequence (e.g., generating a hypothesis before 
evaluating evidence) to engage in so as to solve a problem. Furthermore, it is argued that the 






(Fischer et al., 2014) the more scientific they can be considered. This means that a person may 
understand problem solving completely in terms of epistemic processes of scientific inquiry 
while another person may see the very same problem as completely “practical” in a sense that 
it has nothing to do with engagement in scientific reasoning processes. Or to use an analogy, 
similarly to the expert/novice dimension on problem solving “strategies”(Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Ericsson, 2006; Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983), the present work argues 
that there might be a “scientific/non-scientific” dimension of problem solving that can show 
individual differences and thus, might be fruitfully used for creating 
heterogeneous/homogeneous groups regarding their prior knowledge (i.e., problem solving 
scripts) beyond e.g., the expert-novice dimension (e.g., Wiley & Jolly, 2003).    
 According to the Script Theory of Guidance (Fischer et al., 2013) such scripts (e.g., on 
problem solving) can have an effect on the groups’ performance by guiding collaborating 
partners’ engagement in collaborative processes (e.g., scientific reasoning). More specifically, 
the more divergent strategies reasoning partners have, the more they may stimulate each other 
during solving a problem, or even the opposite: the more conflicts they may face.  
 One argument is that reasoners solving problems in heterogeneous groups might 
stimulate each other (Dunbar, 1995; Paulus, 2000), e.g., by exchanging their different 
perspectives on a problem solving task (Miura & Hida, 2004; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). 
Similarly, reasoning partners’ diverse problem solving scripts might be complementary 
(Paulus, 2000) to each other leading to a scaffolding effect (Fischer et al., 2013) on and even 
to conceptual change through e.g., filling the gaps in each other’s knowledge (Chi, 2008). 
Empirical studies (e.g., a meta-analysis by Bowers et al., 2000) indicate that such often 
assumed advantages of group diversity are likely to be a matter of task-type. The authors 






better on tasks that are clearly defined and require simple responses from the problem solver 
(e.g., solving a puzzle). On the other hand, heterogeneous groups seem to perform better on 
complex problem solving tasks that require cognitive engagement (e.g., business games). 
Further empirical studies (Canham et al., 2012; Wiley & Jolly, 2003) support their findings 
that group heterogeneity is beneficial for innovative problem solving that resemble more on 
complex than easy-to-solve tasks. Regarding scientific (analogical) reasoning, Dunbar (1995), 
for example notes that “when a problem arises, a group of similar minded individuals will not 
provide more information to make analogies than a single individual” (p. 13). Later he adds 
“Members of a research group should have different, but overlapping research backgrounds. 
This will foster group problem solving and analogical reasoning.” (p. 16). These notions are 
in accordance with the empirical findings on group problem solving suggesting that complex 
tasks such as solving authentic problems as a scientifically knowledgeable practitioner might 
benefit from group heterogeneity.       
 Yet, it is important to consider those empirical observations which emphasize that 
often heterogeneous groups may need more effort (e.g., time, engagement) to develop a 
common understanding of the problem and to coordinate their strategies to solve it (Bullough 
et al., 2002; Rummel & Spada, 2005). In addition, studies (see e.g., Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012) 
for a review demonstrated that collaborating partners having different memory retrieval 
strategies might face the phenomenon of collaborative inhibition through retrieval disruption, 
i.e., they recall less items than they would individually do due to the different retrieval 
strategies they apply. Such results indicate that heterogeneous problem solving scripts might 
similarly result in a collaborative inhibition effect. Namely, group members’ different 
problem solving strategies can not only complement but also interfere with each other and in 






For example, when collaborating teachers leading a class together have different approaches 
to engage their students, it might lead to coordinating problems: e.g., one of them may want to 
find out whether the students are not interested or maybe have some misunderstanding, while 
the other teacher would disagree and implement a solution as quickly as possible. It is 
possible that ideas for alternative explanations on the problem may remain hidden due to such 
disagreements between collaborating partners. 
 All in all, the effects of group heterogeneity regarding group members’ problem-
solving scripts on the groups’ engagement in scientific reasoning processes has not yet been 
empirically addressed. Considering the abovementioned studies, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that groups might benefit from diverse thinking as long as they have some shared 
knowledge based on which they can establish a common understanding that guides them 
















5. Measurement of Scientific Reasoning 
A second issue to consider regarding the main question of this dissertation, i.e., comparing 
collaborative vs individual problem solving with respect to scientific reasoning, is the 
measurement of scientific reasoning. As earlier (see Chapter 2) proposed, scientific reasoning 
can be understood as a complex process with two main components: process and content 
aspects. The process aspect was introduced through different epistemic processes in which a 
scientifically knowledgeable problem solver can be expected to engage in. Meanwhile, the 
content aspect was defined as the application of scientific (e.g., empirical, theoretical) 
knowledge when solving problems. In this two-dimensional approach, while the content 
aspect seems to be specific enough for further operationalization, analysis and conclusions; 
the process aspect, due to its multiple components (i.e., the eight epistemic processes), leaves 
probably more degrees of freedom for operationalization, analysis and conclusions than 
optimal. To be more specific, on the one hand, the content aspect, following its earlier 
definition (Chapter 2.5), can be operationalized and measured in a relatively problem-free 
manner by applying quantitative content analysis (Rourke, Anderson, Garrison, & Archer, 
2000; Chi, 1997): e.g., by measuring the extent to which participants refer to scientific content 
while solving a problem (“coding and counting” strategy). Here, the conclusion would also 
come more or less clear: e.g., if groups refer on average more to scientific content than 
individuals do, it could indicate that collaborative problem solving is more science-based than 
individual problem solving. Therefore, it seems that the unidimensional content aspect of 
scientific reasoning can be captured by a “coding and counting” approach of content analysis.  
 However, the same “coding and counting” approach for measuring the process aspect 
of scientific reasoning (i.e., as engagement in the eight epistemic processes) would lead to 






conclusions one can make about scientific reasoning after the analysis. To give an example, 
the process aspect of scientific reasoning can be indicated by the engagement in each of the 
epistemic processes. If a researcher decides to apply the “coding and counting” approach to 
measure scientific reasoning, and the results show that e.g., groups engage more in 
hypothesizing but less in evaluating evidence compared to individuals, then what could be 
concluded from that with respect to scientific reasoning? In that case the researcher faces a 
dilemma whether collaborative or individual problem solving could be considered as more 
science-based. This dilemma could be in part resolved if the researcher rephrases the question, 
and asks in what respect could collaborative problem solving be considered as more science-
based than individual problem solving. Yet, the example shows that while the “coding and 
counting” approach allows the researcher to inspect how collaboration may affect each 
component (i.e., epistemic processes) of scientific reasoning; the main limitation of this 
approach is that conclusive statements regarding the overall scientific reasoning are difficult 
to be made. 
 On the other hand, an alternative methodological framework that affords the 
measurement of scientific reasoning on a “higher level” (i.e., overall scientific reasoning 
throughout the discourse) derived from its elementary components (i.e., epistemic processes) 
could solve the abovementioned problem. Measuring scientific reasoning on the “higher 
level” could inform the researcher about the overall “scientific quality” of problem solving. In 
this way, it could afford more robust comparisons between reasoning contexts (e.g., 
collaborative vs individual reasoning). For example, although studies indicate that 
collaborative reasoners compared to individuals engage to a different extent in some 
epistemic processes such as hypothesis generation and evidence evaluation (Okada & Simon, 






indicative reasoning patterns for collaborative vs individual problem solving. Identifying such 
patterns as “higher level” indicators of scientific reasoning could allow further analyses, e.g., 
on the impact of different (collaborative vs individual) patterns of scientific reasoning on 
problem solving outcomes and learning gains (Chi, 2009; Suthers, 2005). Yet, the question is 
how to measure scientific reasoning on a “higher level” that accounts for all the elementary 
components, i.e., epistemic processes, involved.  
 To answer that question, i.e. how to derive information about the overall scientific 
reasoning from its components, it is important to clarify the (theoretical) relationships of those 
components to each other that might be also indicative to the subsequent methodology: i.e., 
their non-orthogonality. This dissertation argues that epistemic processes are not independent 
from each other. They probably reflect on different interrelated stages of scientific inquiry 
(e.g., Fischer et al., 2014). For example, questioning might be directly related to evidence 
generation (Kuhn & Dean, 2005); hypotheses might be derived from available evidence 
(Klahr & Dunbar, 1988); while, on the other hand, evidence is optimally evaluated in the 
context of one or more hypotheses (de Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998; Kuhn, 1989; Osborne, 
2010; Sandoval et al., 2014). Thus, this dissertation understands scientific reasoning as a 
coherent process where epistemic processes evolve in relation to each other rather than occur 
as independent constructs. Therefore, the measurement of scientific reasoning on a “higher 
level” should also take into account the inter-relatedness of epistemic processes.  
 Beyond the abovementioned problems, focusing on isolated, independently measured 
processes without an accompanying analysis of reasoning process on the “high level” (e.g., by 
identifying patterns of reasoning) is an existing methodological problem also in the literature 
(Chi, 1997; Jeong, 2005; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Suthers, 2005). As, for example, Klahr and 






reasoning has been to investigate each skill in isolation […] much remains to be learned about 
how the stages interact and about how the interaction is influenced by prior knowledge” (p. 
2). Indeed, many authors emphasize that scientific reasoning is a complex process and that 
reasoners may engage in a series of epistemic processes during scientific reasoning (Chinn & 
Malhotra, 2002; Fischer et al., 2014; Osborne, 2010; White & Frederiksen, 1998; 
Zimmerman, 2000). Yet, “coding and counting” approaches seem to dominate the analysis of 
scientific reasoning (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Métrailler et al., 2008; Okada & Simon, 1997; 
Simon et al., 1981; Teasley, 1995). 
 To summarize, analyzing the process aspect of scientific reasoning by applying a 
merely “coding and counting” strategy leads to methodological concerns. These problems, as 
mentioned above, seem to necessitate the search for a methodological formalism (Chi, 1997) 
which affords to (1) identify how elementary (epistemic) processes of scientific reasoning 
relate to each other (e.g., how they co-occur over time during the discourse); and to (2) draw 
valid conclusions about the overall process of scientific reasoning beyond the engagement in 
individual epistemic processes. In the following, this dissertation inspects whether reasoning 
patterns stemming from the relations between epistemic processes might serve as “higher 
level” indicators of scientific reasoning that are capable to fulfill the here mentioned criteria. 
To be more specific, the present work investigates which analytical approach, i.e., sequential 
analysis or network analysis, might be more appropriate to identify such patterns of scientific 
reasoning.  
5.1. Sequential analysis  
One methodological approach to identify patterns between epistemic processes of scientific 
reasoning could be sequential analysis (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997; Chiu, 2005; Cress & 






approaches in the following way. While a “coding and counting” approach is a useful method 
to identify and summarize occurrences of e.g., epistemic processes within a discourse; 
sequential analysis can be used to identify in what sequence those epistemic processes 
“typically” follow each other in the discourse (e.g., Cress & Hesse, 2013). Researchers assess 
this “typicality” by calculating the transitional probability, i.e., the probability that one 
process follows another (Jeong, 2005; Cress & Hesse, 2013). Once such transitional 
probabilities between epistemic processes are quantified (e.g., as odds-ratio or Yule’s Q: see 
e.g., in Eells et al., 2011) the researcher can statistically compare (e.g., by applying z-scores; 
(Jeong, 2005) whether the probability of one sequence is higher than the probability of 
another sequence. Moreover, patterns such as chains of reasoning, e.g., transition diagrams 
(Cress & Hesse, 2013; Erkens, Kanselaar, Prangsma, & Jaspers, 2003; Jeong, 2005) can be 
identified, where the strength of connection between epistemic processes can be represented 
in the model (see Figure 3).  
 
 







 Sequential analysis as well as its alternatives (Chiu, 2005; Chiu, 2008; Zhao, Sinha, 
Black, & Cassell, 2016) has been applied with success for analyzing reasoning processes 
during problem solving in practical professions such as psychotherapy (Eells et al., 2011), 
business (Jeong, 2003) and teaching (Hou et al., 2009). Yet, while this approach is useful to 
analyze sequential patterns in data (Chiu & Khoo, 2005), it yields patterns of predictive 
(Jeong, 2005) relations between epistemic processes. For this reason, sequential analysis can 
be warranted best if the researcher has a good (e.g., theoretical) reason to assume that 
predictive relations can reliably model discourse processes coded in the data or in cases when 
the question of interest is predictive. Nevertheless, there may be exploratory purposes to 
identify transition probability patterns such as the one demonstrated by Figure 3. In that case, 
arrows representing predictive relations (transitions) can show in both directions. However, 
the present work argues that in case a predictive (or unidirectional) assumption cannot be 
supported, measurement approaches that deal with non-directional relationships (e.g., co-
occurrences) between epistemic processes can be more parsimonious, and consequently, more 
reasonable choices.   
 Furthermore, although analyzing process sequences (Cress & Hesse, 2013; Jeong, 
2005) can fulfill the earlier mentioned criteria for a methodological approach, i.e., being able 
to capture relations between epistemic processes; it may be less powerful when it comes to the 
other earlier-set criteria: namely affording drawing conclusions about the overall reasoning 
process. On the one hand, transition probability patterns (see Figure 3) can represent the 
overall reasoning process, and “typical” sequential patterns can be extracted by applying this 
approach (Cress & Hesse, 2013; Erkens et al., 2003). On the other hand, a “summary” of the 
model seems to be problematic. For example, it can be problematic to extract a quantification 






patterns in that respect. Therefore, to find a metrics that can quantitatively represent the 
overall pattern of reasoning is necessary in order to compare collaborative and individual 
reasoners.  
5.2. Network analysis  
An alternative approach to sequential analysis in order to (1) identify connections 
between reasoning processes as well as to (2) be able to make conclusive statements regarding 
the overall reasoning in a discourse might be to investigate if reasoning processes may form a 
network, i.e., a pattern of interconnected processes. The idea of network identification for 
representing knowledge is based on semantic network models that were developed in the late 
1960s (Collins & Quillian, 1969). Those early frameworks attempted to model memory 
subsystems, i.e., semantic memory by demonstrating how different components of knowledge 
are interconnected with each other. Their main proposal was that (semantic) knowledge 
components are organized in a network structure that can be described by its elementary units 
such as nodes and connections between the nodes, where nodes would represent concepts and 
their connections represent how strongly those concepts are associated with each other and, 
therefore, predict the accessibility of one concept in the presence of another (i.e., the 
likelihood and speed of memory retrieval; Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Further 
research on conceptual networks (e.g. Chi & Koeske, 1983) used interview data in order to 
identify to what extent elaborated knowledge (i.e., the density of conceptual networks) may 
predict later performance.  
Beyond identifying associations, i.e., networks in conceptual knowledge, more recent 
studies pose the question how knowledge can be shared among collaborating partners, i.e., 
within a social network (Aviv, Erlich, Ravid, & Geva, 2003; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & 






2012; Palonen & Hakkarainen, 2000). Those studies look at social network analysis as a 
useful toolkit of learning analytics (Aviv et al., 2003; Ferguson, 2012; Palonen & 
Hakkarainen, 2000) that can identify networks of interactions between learning partners in 
order to find out how knowledge sharing processes could be optimized.  
From the approaches of conceptual networks and social network analysis it seems that 
network analysis may be an applicable methodological approach to analyze epistemic 
processes in verbal data. Also, networks provide quantifiable features (e.g., density of 
connections; (Chi & Koeske, 1983) that can be useful for analyzing how epistemic processes 
might relate to each other throughout the overall discourse. Such a quantified representation 
of overall patterns of scientific reasoning can make network analysis a more applicable 
methodological approach compared to sequential analysis when contrasting collaborating 
partners with individuals regarding scientific reasoning. Furthermore, network analysis might 
be also preferable over sequential analysis when the researcher does not have a (theoretical) 
justification to interpret the connections between epistemic processes in a sequential (i.e., 
predictive) manner.  
All in all, network analysis seems to be an optimal methodological framework to 
identify patterns of scientific reasoning, because it fulfills both criteria set earlier in this 
chapter for a methodological framework. Namely, it affords (1) the identification of 
relationships between epistemic processes and (2) the interpretation of those relations on a 
higher level, i.e., drawing conclusions regarding the overall scientific reasoning process in the 
discourse. Yet, the question is what concrete methodology to apply to identify patterns of 
relationships between epistemic processes of scientific reasoning. Therefore, in the next 
chapter (Chapter 6) this dissertation introduces a specific approach of network analysis that 






network analysis techniques (Shaffer, Collier, & Ruis, 2016). These features can support the 
analysis on the way of answering the main research question of this dissertation, namely 
comparing collaborative and individual scientific reasoning. 
5.3. Epistemic network analysis 
 A possible approach to analyze patterns (i.e., networks) of scientific reasoning can be 
epistemic network analysis (ENA; Shaffer et al., 2009)  ENA was originally developed to 
assess professional skill acquisition through the changes in epistemologies of professionals-
to-be (e.g., (e.g., Hatfield, 2015). The method analyzes discourse patterns by looking at co-
occurrences between codes. Based on the observed co-occurrences epistemic networks can be 
identified. Also, ENA offers quantification as well as qualitative representations of those 
networks for further analysis (Shaffer et al., 2016). In the following, the present work 
introduces this method in more detail to inspect how this type of network analysis might be a 
useful methodological tool to extract patterns of scientific reasoning from process (i.e., 
discourse or think aloud) data in order to use it for further quantitative and qualitative 
analyses.  
 ENA is a method to identify epistemic networks based on co-occurrences between 
discourse processes (Collier, Ruis & Shaffer, 2016; Shaffer et al., 2009). As Shaffer et al. 
(2016) points out, while many network analysis methods can measure certain features of 
networks (e.g., density), they are often optimized to deal with different sort of data (such as 
larger datasets with a high number of nodes); and provide summary statistics (e.g., density) 
that are not that satisfactory for datasets with relatively small number of nodes and often 
dense connections of weighted connections. At the same time, as the authors clarify, ENA can 






connections. This can apply for identifying a limited number of epistemic processes in verbal 
data.  
 The methodological approach of ENA (1) identifies co-occurrences between coded 
discourse processes by the the method of “moving stanza window” (Siebert-Evenstone et al., 
2016): and (2) provides qualitative as well as quantitative “summaries” of the observed co-
occurrences between discourses: e.g., “average” epistemic networks of a group of individual 
reasoners compared to the “average” epistemic networks of the group of collaborative 
reasoners (Shaffer et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 4. Illustration of the “moving stanza window” concept of ENA: (a) Exemplary coded 
transcript; (b) Moving reference unit (bold-framed) with moving stanza window; (c) The 
observed co-occurrences between epistemic processes (based on Siebert-Evenstone et al., 
2016). 
Figure 4 illustrates the concept of the “moving stanza window” method. This method allows 
the observation of co-occurrences between a selected “reference unit” (see bold-framed codes 
on Figure 4b) and a number of preceding codes which codes together constitute the “stanza 
window” (see the three codes preceding the bold-framed codes on Figure 4b). The size of the 
“stanza window”, i.e., the number of codes preceding the reference unit can be selected by the 
researcher in the beginning of the analysis (on Figure 4b the moving stanza window size is 
Outcome
A: But when she understands everything in class… // EE EE EE EE EE
Maybe she cannot apply it. // HG HG HG HG HG
Maybe she understands, for example, in math, // HG HG HG HG HG
that she knows the procedure // HG HG HG HG HG
but she cannot apply it.// HG HG HG HG HG
B: Yes, that should be discussed with the parents, // CS CS CS CS CS












MSWS = 3). Once the algorithm starts, it takes each coded unit in the transcript one by one as 
a reference unit and tracks as many steps back as the size of the stanza window is (here 
MSWS = 3) in order to identify the connections. These steps are demonstrated on Figure 4b 
where each column represents a step during the movement of the stanza window. In the first 
column, the bold-framed code of “HG” represents the reference unit while the preceding 
codes of “EE, HG, HG” constitute the codes appearing in the stanza window. At this step, a 
connection between codes of “EE” and “HG” is observed. Then, the reference unit and the 
stanza window moves one step further (see the second column on Figure 3b) in order to make 
the same comparison between the reference line and the codes in the stanza window. This 
process ends once all coded units have been compared with preceding coded units. Then, 
further mathematical transformations and dimension reduction techniques (see e.g., Collier et 
al., 2016) are automatically conducted in order to extract network parameters that are 
identified by the relative frequencies of the overall co-occurrences of coded units. These 
network parameters (e.g., locations on nodes; strengths of connections between nodes; the 
centroids of the networks; Shaffer et al., 2016) are used for visualization and quantitative 
comparisons of different networks.  
 Epistemic networks have at least three relevant components for further analysis: 
nodes, connections between the nodes and centroids. Nodes in epistemic networks represent 
codes from the coded transcript (see e.g., “HG” on Figure 4a as code in the transcript and on 
Figure 4c as a “node” in a network). The connections between two codes indicate that those 
codes co-occurred over time in the discourse. More specifically, higher relative frequency of 
observed co-occurrences between two codes indicate stronger weighted connections between 
those codes compared to codes that do not co-occur that frequently throughout the discourse. 






discourse, with connections between each other that become “thicker” the more often these 
codes occur together within the chosen stanza window size.  
Furthermore, quantitative comparison between networks or groups of networks (e.g., 
networks of individuals vs networks of collaborating partners) is possible by using calculated 
centroids for every epistemic networks generated by ENA. A centroid is determined by the 
strength of connections between nodes in an epistemic network. The centroid value is 
calculated as the mean of connection weights (Shaffer et al., 2016) and as such, it represents 
all the weighted co-occurrences in a network on the discourse or on the group level 
(depending on whether the epistemic network represents e.g., a collaborating pair’s network 
or a network of a group of collaborating pairs. While this value provides information about 
the structural arrangement of any network, it allows the quantitative comparison of different 
networks (e.g., average network of collaborating partners vs average network of individuals) 
in the same space, based on the idea that the further two centroids fall from each other the 
more probably they represent different networks (Shaffer et al., 2016). Finally, qualitative 
comparison of epistemic networks is possible by interpreting visualizations. ENA offers 
different visualizations for that purpose, such as the visualization of networks (see e.g., Figure 
5) or the visualization of subtracted networks. Subtraction of networks means that the values 
or strengths of nodes and connections of one network can be subtracted from another network. 
The resulting “subtracted network” represents the difference between the two networks and it 
can, thus, illustrate what makes e.g., collaborative networks of scientific reasoning different 
from individual networks of scientific reasoning. 
 ENA has been successfully used to identify networks of skills relevant for future 
practitioners in domains such as engineering  (Arastoopour, Shaffer, Swiecki, Ruis & Chesler, 






by calculating networks that represent overall co-occurrences of reasoning processes in a 
discourse as well as in a group (average network of e.g., individual reasoners), it allows not 
only drawing valid conclusions regarding overall scientific reasoning, but also quantitative 
and qualitative comparisons between different groups of reasoners (e.g., collaborators vs 
individuals). Therefore, ENA seems to be an optimal methodological framework (Chi, 1997) 
to identify patterns of scientific reasoning and to compare groups (i.e., individuals and 








Figure 5. An exemplary epistemic network. Thicker nodes represent more frequent codes and 
thicker connections represent more frequent co-occurrences between those codes. Source: 











6. General Research Questions 
The main aim of the present dissertation is to find out whether establishing a collaborative 
problem solving context can facilitate the engagement of future practitioners in scientific 
reasoning while they are solving authentic professional problems from their future practice. 
The introduction presented a novel framework on scientific reasoning (Fischer et al., 2014) 
and according to that framework it suggested that problem solvers can engage in scientific 
reasoning in two main ways: (1) by engaging in epistemic processes (process level of 
scientific reasoning) and (2) by applying scientific knowledge (the content level of scientific 
reasoning).  
 Empirical studies show that (future) practitioners show difficulties at both the process 
and the content levels of scientific reasoning (Hetmanek et al., 2015; Stark et al., 2009; van de 
Pol et al., 2011). Therefore, it is a reasonable question to what extent a minimal intervention 
approach may facilitate the engagement of future professionals in scientific reasoning 
processes and content use.  
 Research indicate that collaboration can foster the engagement in productive reasoning 
(Teasley, 1997; Chi, 2009) as well as scientific reasoning benefits from a collaborative 
compared to an individual inquiry context (e.g., Okada & Simon, 1997). Yet, the advantages 
of collaboration cannot always be manifest and difficulties between collaborating partners 
often occur (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Stasser & Titus, 1985). Besides, empirical research 
investigating the effect of collaboration on different processes and, at the same time, on the 
content aspect of scientific reasoning is scarce (e.g., Métrailler et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
present work investigates whether and in what respect collaboration, as a potential learning 






during professional problem solving. Accordingly, the following research questions are set to 
guide inquiry: 
 
Research question 1: To what extent do collaborative reasoners engage in scientific 
reasoning processes and content use compared to individuals when solving authentic 
problems from their future professional practice? 
 
To be able to find a reliable answer to the research question, it is important to take into 
account that the effect between collaborative and individual reasoning might be influenced by 
factors such as group heterogeneity regarding group members’ prior script-like knowledge 
(Canham et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2013). Therefore, dyadic heterogeneity on its members’ 
problem solving scripts is considered for the second research question:  
 
Research question 2: To what extent does group heterogeneity regarding its members’ 
problem solving scripts influence the engagement in scientific reasoning processes and 
content use?  
  
Moreover, scientific reasoning is a complex skill or set of skills (e.g., Osborne, 2010). 
Therefore, to validly capture the difference between scientific reasoning skills of collaborative 
vs individual reasoners, it is necessary to apply an appropriate measurement tool that affords 
to capture such complexity of reasoning skills. For this purpose, the present study chose the 
method of epistemic network analysis (Shaffer et al., 2009) that proved to be a reliable and 
valid method to identify reasoning patterns in different professional domains (e.g., Shaffer, 







Research question 3: What patterns of scientific reasoning can be identified that capture the 
distinctive features of collaborative vs individual scientific reasoning processes?  
 
To answer these research questions, two empirical studies were conducted and these are going 
to be discussed in the following chapters. Study 1 (Chapter 8) is aiming to provide an analysis 
to empirically test Research question 1-2; while Study 2 (Chapter 9) is focusing on Research 




















7. Study 1: Pre-service teachers’ scientific reasoning during pedagogical 
problem solving: better together? 
 
7.1. Abstract 
Many professions require that professionals solve practice problems by referring to scientific 
theories and evidence in a systematic, inquiry-oriented way. However, during their training, 
future practitioners often have problems in doing so. Collaborating with other future 
colleagues is discussed as a way that might help to establish more evidence-based problem-
solving in practice. Although some theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that groups 
may outperform individuals in scientific reasoning, there is a lack of empirical evidence on 
comparing groups with individuals on reasoning scientifically when solving authentic 
problems from their practical domain (e.g, teachers reasoning about their pupil’s 
performance). According to the Script Theory of Guidance, partners’ engagement in 
collaborative reasoning is influenced by reasoners’ initial scripts such as prior knowledge on 
how to solve problems. We therefore hypothesize that (1) collaborating partners might solve 
problems in a more scientific or evidence-based manner than individuals, and that (2) 
engaging in collaborative scientific reasoning is influenced by the heterogeneity of the 
collaborators’ problem-solving scripts. In this study, 76 pre-service teachers solved an 
authentic problem case (reasoned about an underperforming student) from their future 
practice either individually or in dyads. Results show that dyads engaged more extensively in 
generating hypotheses, evaluating evidence, and they were also more likely to draw 
conclusions compared to individuals. On the other hand, dyads engaged less in generating 
solutions to the problem and referred to a lesser extent to scientific theories and evidence than 
individuals did. Furthermore, the more heterogeneous dyads were with respect to their 






results indicate that (1) scientific reasoning processes of pre-service teachers can benefit from 
reasoning about a problem with a partner. Also, (2) heterogeneity of groups regarding their 
problem solving approaches should be considered when planning collaborative reasoning 
sessions in higher education. 
 Keywords: evidence-based teaching; collaborative reasoning; problem-solving scripts; 
scientific reasoning 
7.2. Research Problem 
In many practical professions it is crucially important that practitioners make decisions in an 
evidence-based manner and engage in scientific reasoning. This means that when they solve 
problems, practitioners should (1) use relevant scientific findings from their domain (2) in a 
systematic inquiry-based manner similar to the way scientific knowledge is constructed 
(Fischer et al., 2014). For example, teachers solve pedagogical problems everyday such as 
how to spark their students’ interest or deal with differences in performance  (e.g., König, 
Blömeke, Paine, Schmidt, & Hsieh, 2011). To enhance the validity of their solutions, teachers 
need to apply psychological and didactical knowledge (see Baumert & Kunter, 2006) as well 
as to engage in a systematic, inquiry oriented way of reasoning by developing explanations 
about the problem and negotiating solutions for it (Fischer et al., 2014).  Although developing 
general scientific reasoning skills is typically part of the curricula in higher education (e.g., 
pre-service teacher training), utilizing scientific reasoning for solving complex problems is 
frequently a problem for future practitioners (Gruber, Mandl, & Renkl, 2000). 
 We argue that one way to engage students during their academic training in scientific 
reasoning while solving authentic problems may be via encouraging them to collaborate while 
solving a problem instead of solving it alone (Baeten & Simons, 2014). Studies on 






learning partners can be more beneficial for learning outcomes and also for scientific 
reasoning than simply reasoning alone (Chi, 2009; Okada & Simon, 1997). Whether it is also 
the case for profession-related problem solving of future practitioners is the first main 
question of this article.  
 Nevertheless, problem solving groups can be very different from another regarding 
their members’ knowledge; motivation; aims etc. that can all influence group performance. 
Indeed, future practitioners have diverse backgrounds and in addition, they might show very 
different approaches on solving complex problems and whether and how they would engage 
in scientific reasoning while solving problems.  These approaches or “problem-solving 
scripts”, according to the Script Theory of Guidance (Fischer, Kollar, Stegmann & Wecker, 
2013), can have an effect on the groups’ performance by guiding collaborating partners’ 
engagement in scientific reasoning. More specifically, the more divergent strategies reasoning 
partners have, the more they may stimulate each other during solving a problem, or even the 
opposite: the more conflicts they may face. Whether or not such problem-solving scripts 
influence the engagement in scientific reasoning during collaborative problem solving is the 
second main question of this paper. 
 To summarize, the main aim of this study is to investigate whether scientific reasoning 
of pre-service teachers who solve an authentic problem from their future practice differs if 
they work (1) individually or as a group, and (2) if the group they are working in is 
homogeneous or heterogeneous with respect to the group members’ problem-solving scripts.  
7.3. Scientific Reasoning and Problem Solving 
In many professions, problem solving requires the application of scientific theories and 
evidence from the domain in which the problem is grounded as well as systematic strategies 






Rummel, & Spada, 2011; Rittle-Johnson, Siegler, & Alibali, 2001; Rummel & Spada, 2005; 
Weinstock, 2009). In some professions, this has been labeled "evidence-based practice" (e.g. 
(Satterfield et al., 2009). Fischer et al. (2014) argues that evidence-based practice can be seen 
as a specific instance of scientific reasoning: it can be understood as an engagement in distinct 
epistemic processes that are useful to construct knowledge about the causes of the problem 
and to derive possible solutions to it (see also Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Zimmerman, 2000). In 
the context of this study, we differentiate between the content and the process level of 
scientific reasoning.   
 At the content level, problem solvers are expected to refer to relevant theories and 
empirical studies that have been conducted within their domain, as they are confronted with 
an authentic problem from their (future) professional practice (Gruber, Mandl & Renkl, 
2000). For example, teachers and pre-service teachers should be able to apply psychological 
and educational theories of learning, motivation, instruction etc. and related research findings 
in order to solve a given problem (Hetmanek et al., 2015; Voss, Kunter, & Baumert, 2011), 
such as how to best support an underperforming student. 
 At the process level, scientific reasoning can be viewed as an inquiry process (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988) that is characterized by the engagement in epistemic processes reasoners 
follow while solving a problem (Fischer et al., 2014). Based on Fischer et al. (2014), we argue 
that when being confronted with problems from their actual practice, (future) professionals 
engage in a set of epistemic processes that are similar to those that scientists engage in when 
solving a research problem. They need to identify the problem itself (Problem Identification); 
ask questions or make statements that guide their further exploration on the problem 
(Questioning); set up candidate explanations for the problem (Hypothesis generation); take 






(Evidence Generation); evaluate the information in the context of their hypotheses (Evidence 
Evaluation); plan interventions / solutions (Constructing artefacts); engage in discussions with 
others to re-evaluate their thoughts (Communicating and scrutinizing) and sum up their 
process to arrive at well-warranted conclusions on how to explain and/or solve the problem 
(Drawing conclusions). 
 Nevertheless, as prior research has shown, (future) professionals seem to have 
difficulties in both the content and process aspects of scientific reasoning. For example, in-
service and pre-service teachers often seem to neglect alternative explanations for given 
problems, frequently use scientific theories and models only in an insufficient manner 
(Sampson & Blanchard, 2012; Stark, Puhl, & Krause, 2009) and have difficulties of applying 
their knowledge to solve educational problems (McNeill & Knight, 2013).  
 Similarly, when teachers assess learning processes, for example, by watching videos 
of teacher-student interactions in the class, they seem to show relatively lower engagement in 
generating evidence-based hypotheses on their own compared to their performance after a 
methods course (Yeh & Santagata, 2015). This suggests that teachers could potentially reason 
better than they do, if they are supported in the right way – and this refers to both the content 
and the process level. With respect to the content level, Lockhorst, Wubbels and van Oers  
(2010) found that in their study teachers indicated a lack of scientific knowledge to assess 
pupil’s learning processes. With respect to the process level, van de Pol, Volman, & 
Beishuizen, (2011) showed that teachers often fail to collect enough evidence to properly 
scaffold the work of their pupils.  
 Taken together, in many domains, (future) professionals show difficulties with regard 
to both components of SR, i.e. engaging in epistemic processes and using scientific content 






(future) professional practice. Thus, searching for ways to help (future) professionals in this 
process in order to prepare them for a more evidence-based future practice is urgently needed.  
7.4. Collaborative Problem Solving and Scientific Reasoning 
One potential way to help future professionals to engage in scientific reasoning is to ask them 
to collaborate while solving complex problems. Psychology and learning research suggest that 
collaborative problem-solving can have benefits over individual problem-solving (Barron, 
2000; Chi, 2009; Chi & Wylie, 2014; Kirschner, Paas, Kirschner & Janssen, 2011; Mullins, 
Rummel & Spada, 2011). Reasoning as a group has the advantage of articulating and building 
on knowledge each collaborating partner brings to explain and solve a problem (Asterhan & 
Schwarz, 2009; Chi & Wylie, 2014; Elbers & Streefland, 2000; Hausmann, Chi, & Roy, 
2004; Kirschner, Paas, Kirschner, & Janssen, 2011; Teasley, 1995). Teasley (1995), for 
example, has demonstrated that in a problem solving context, children showed more 
engagement in productive reasoning when they reasoned together. Namely, dyads’ engaged 
significantly more in hypothesizing than individuals and produced proportionally more 
interpretive talk than, while individuals did. In another study (Okada & Simon, 1997), 
university undergraduates participating as dyads or individuals showed a similar outcome on a 
scientific reasoning task. In this study, dyads engaged more in hypothesis generation and 
evidence evaluation (planned experiments to test the initial hypothesis) than individuals did. 
As the authors note, one reason for such heightened engagement in explanatory behavior may 
be the need to communicate in a more explicit manner (Okada & Simon, 1997). More recent 
studies with psychology undergraduates (Métrailler, Reijnen, Kneser & Opwis, 2008), found 
that although dyads may be proportionally less concerned about hypotheses than individuals, 
but still  engage more in explanatory behavior (e.g., disagreeing with each other). Such 






for meaning-making and knowledge co-construction (Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Hausmann, Chi 
& Roy, 2004) which is a relevant aspect of scientific reasoning (Barron, 2000; Fischer & 
Mandl, 2005; Roschelle, 1992; Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). Such collaborative knowledge 
co-construction can eventually lead to deeper processing of knowledge and better problem 
solving performance (Chi & Wylie, 2014; Hausmann, Chi & Roy, 2004; Kirschner et al., 
2011).  
 Collaboration among professionals such as teachers and pre-service teachers, when 
they solve professional (e.g., pedagogical) problems together rather than individually, might 
offer great benefits too (Baeten & Simons, 2014; Bullough et al., 2002). Collaborating 
teachers have potentially more opportunity to engage in professional discourse: to exchange 
different perspectives and methodological knowledge on teaching and learning which is 
expected to facilitate their growth on becoming reflective and evidence-based practitioners 
(Baeten & Simons, 2014; Birrell & Bullough, 2005; Gardiner & Robinson, 2009; Kamens, 
2007; Nevin, Thousand, & Villa, 2009; Nokes, Bullough Jr., Egan, Birrell, & Merrell Hansen, 
2008). In a field study, for example, Nokes et al. (2008) investigated whether preservice 
teachers benefit from paired teaching. Pre-service teachers in this study had to teach in a 
secondary school for a 15 weeks period. The qualitative interviews with the teachers and their 
mentors indicated that collaboration gave them the opportunity to engage in dialogue, share 
their experiences and become more reflective about their teaching practices.  
 Yet, collaboration does not always work and does not always lead to better reasoning 
processes and outcomes compared to individual reasoning. Groups may suffer from process 
losses due to coordinational difficulties, such as disagreements on how to move on. Such 
coordinational challenges can result in poor performance, e.g., in problem-solving tasks 






& Fischer, 2010). Indeed, unclarified actions can slow down or hinder the development of 
mutual understanding and constructive communication processes  (Horton & Gerrig, 2005; 
Roschelle & Teasley, 1995; Rummel & Spada, 2005). Yet, excessive reliance on shared 
knowledge without discussing unique ideas (e.g., in order to avoid disagreements) has been 
described as another problem that can hinder groups to reach their potential by building on the 
diverse knowledge of its members (Stasser & Titus, 1985).  
 Difficulties with coordination or lack of shared knowledge between collaborators are 
among those problems that have been also reported in the context of professional problem 
solving (e.g., Rummel & Spada, 2005).  In team-teaching, for example, planning the lesson 
with a partner requires coordination between the teachers  (Jang, 2008; Nokes et al., 2008). 
This might, especially in case of disagreements between reasoning partners, lead to 
difficulties (Bullough et al., 2002): collaboration might become time consuming (Jang, 2008) 
and contribute to a higher perceived workload (Nokes et al., 2008). In their review, Baeten 
and Simons (2014) lists the lack of compatibility (e.g., different conceptions of teaching), 
social comparison (that one would outperform the other), the difficulty of providing 
constructive feedback and the perceived increase in workload among the barriers of team-
teaching. In another review, Shin, Lee, & McKenna, (2016) note that all of their reviewed 
studies reported some challenges for preservice teachers in collaborative settings. They 
mention it as problematic that many preservice teachers were unprepared for collaborative 
practices; it was unclear for them what they were supposed to do and often they lacked the 
skills of instructional planning which served as a barrier for fruitful collaboration. 
 All in all, although the cost of coordinating with a partner may require increased 
efforts, exchanging different views is a clear benefit of it, resulting in engagement in 






whether groups really can benefit from the fact that they are working together may heavily 
depend on the way groups are formed. This issue is being explained in the following section.  
7.5. How to Form Groups: about the Heterogeneity of Collaborators’ Problem-
Solving Scripts 
 Within collaborative learning research, there have been long debates about the 
question whether group members should be similar (i.e., homogeneous) or dissimilar (i.e., 
heterogeneous) to each other (e.g., Bowers, Pharmer, & Salas, 2000). On the one hand, in 
heterogeneous groups, reasoners may stimulate (Paulus, 2000) each other by bringing new 
perspectives to a problem solving task (Miura & Hida, 2004; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). A meta-
analysis by Bowers, Pharmer and Salas (2000) concludes that homogeneous teams tend to 
perform better on rather routine-like low-difficulty tasks that are clearly defined and require 
simple responses (e.g., solving a puzzle) while heterogeneous teams perform better on more 
complex problem solving tasks that require more cognitive resources (e.g., business games). 
More recent empirical studies (Canham et al., 2012; Wiley et al., 2013) also support the 
notion that group heterogeneity is beneficial for innovative problem solving. On the other 
hand, heterogeneous groups may need more time and effort to reach a common understanding 
of the problem and coordinating their strategies to solve it (Bullough et al., 2002; Rummel & 
Spada, 2005). For example, in teacher collaboration diverse approaches for classroom 
management has been reported rather problematic (Shin et al., 2016). 
 Overall, available empirical studies addressing group heterogeneity are not conclusive 
regarding in what aspects groups should be heterogeneous. They lack a joint framework on 
how heterogeneity can be operationalized and measured across studies (Van Knippenberg & 






 Indeed, groups can be homo- or heterogeneous in a number of different ways. While 
previous studies focused on prior knowledge (Wiley & Jolly, 2003; Wu, Liao, & Dai, 2015), 
demographic background (Curseu & Pluut, 2013; Wegge et al., 2008), or attitudes (Curseu & 
Pluut, 2013), the present article is particularly interested in group heterogeneity of the 
collaborators’ “problem-solving scripts”, which define as their knowledge and expectations 
on how to reason about problems from professional practice (Fischer et al., 2013). For 
example, clinical reasoning scripts, e.g., “illness scripts” (Charlin, Boshuizen, Custers, & 
Feltovich, 2007) or “ward round scripts” (Beltermann, Wessels, Kollar, & Fischer, subm.) can 
guide medical professionals diagnostic behavior. A physician meeting a pale patient can 
identify that there may be a problem, and after engaging in a systematic evidence generation 
procedure (e.g., listening to the symptoms, conducting further investigations), she can revise 
the plausible hypotheses (diagnoses) that can answer the original problem (Charlin et al., 
2007).  Similarly, in the domain of teaching, when faced with underperforming students, one 
teacher may tackle such problems by systematically analyzing the problem and deliberately 
searching for educational or psychological theories to make inferences regarding promising 
actions. As part of the process, she may generate hypotheses about the reasons for the 
problem (e.g., heterogeneity in abilities), evaluate evidence (e.g., the problem is specific to 
the given situation, therefore ability might not play the decisive role), and generate solutions 
(e.g., the intervention should target the specific situation or the students’ perception of such 
situations). Yet, another teacher may solve such problems by mentally going through past 
experiences and quickly jump to conclusions without evaluating the available information 
further. For example, she might think of a friend in school who behaved in a similar 






friends’ case. We assume that such “reasoning scripts” (see also Schank, 1999) direct the way 
reasoners understand and act in a given problem-solving situation (Weinstock, 2009).  
 Although the Script Theory of Guidance (Fischer, Kollar, Stegmann & Wecker, 2013)  
suggests that reasoners’ individual (problem-solving) scripts may have an impact on their 
collaborative reasoning (Kollar, Fischer, & Slotta, 2007); the effects of the level of 
heterogeneity of problem-solving scripts within groups on reasoning processes while solving 
authentic problems has hardly been empirically addressed (Vogel et al., 2016). Scarce 
attempts (Pavitt & Johnson, 2001) have taken into account individuals’ scripts on group 
problem solving processes; yet, those studies have not investigated whether the level of group 
heterogeneity influences certain problem solving processes.  
7.6. Research Questions 
 In our empirical study, we were interested in whether and how pre-service teachers 
engage in scientific reasoning while solving authentic problems from their future professional 
practice. More specifically, we were interested in the question whether (a) groups (dyads) 
would refer more or less to scientific theories and evidence and perform epistemic processes 
of (scientific) reasoning more extensively than individuals and whether (b) homo-
/heterogeneity of dyads’ problem-solving scripts might influence to what extent dyads refer to 
scientific content and perform certain epistemic processes of (scientific) reasoning. Thus, we 
set up the following two research questions:  
 RQ1: Do dyads of preservice teachers differ from individual preservice teachers in the 
extent to which they (a) refer to scientific theories and evidence and (b) in their engagement 






 RQ2: Within dyads, does heterogeneity regarding group members’ problem-solving 
scripts affect the extent to which dyads of preservice teachers (a) refer to scientific theories 
and evidence and (b) engage in different epistemic processes of scientific reasoning? 
7.7. Method 
7.7.1. Participants and Design 
76 teacher education students (59 female, MAge = 21.22, SD = 3.98) from a German 
university (on their first to fifth semesters) participated in the study. They received course 
credit for their participation. To answer research question 1, each participant was randomly 
assigned, in a between-subject-manner, to either an individual (16 students, 13 female, MAge = 
22.31; SD = 6.73) or a dyadic (60 students, i.e. 30 dyads, 46 females, MAge = 20.93; SD = 
2.85) condition. To answer research question 2, an index was calculated to measure each 
dyad’s heterogeneity level based on a test in which students had to individually describe how 
they approach authentic problems from educational practice (see below). The resulting score 
on the heterogeneity index was then used as a predictor for the use of scientific theories and 
evidence as well as for the dyads’ engagement in the different epistemic processes of 
scientific reasoning.  
7.7.2. Procedure 
The procedure of the study consisted of four steps. Regardless of the condition (dyadic 
vs individual), in the first three steps every student participated individually. In the last 
(problem solving) step, students participated either as dyads or individually depending on the 
condition they were assigned to. First, students filled in a computer-based questionnaire on 
demographic variables. After that, they were given a computer-based card sorting task to 
measure their problem-solving scripts (see below). Then, they were given five minutes to read 






from their introductory psychology class and short descriptions of theories and concepts (e.g., 
on strategic use of short-term memory and a classification of learning strategies). After that, 
participants were presented an authentic problem from their future professional practice, 
which was: “You are a teacher in a school. One of your students receives low grades in 
comparison to others. The student looks motivated and it seems she understands the content. 
You know from the parents that she learns diligently at home. You as a teacher, please find 
possible reasons and a solution to the problem”. For dealing with the problem, participants 
had 10 minutes. During these ten minutes, students in the individual condition were asked to 
think aloud while solving the problem; dyads were asked to orally discuss the problem. All 
think-aloud and collaborative discussions were audio-recorded and transcribed for analysis 
(see below). Data from this problem-solving process were used to measure students’ use of 
scientific theories and evidence as well as their engagement in the epistemic processes of 
scientific reasoning (see below). Finally, students were thanked for their participation and 
debriefed. The whole data collection took about one hour for each individual or dyad. 
7.7.3. Independent Variables 
Reasoning setting. Reasoning setting was varied by randomly assigning participants 
to the problem-solving phase either as individuals or dyads. All dyads were randomly 
established. Thus heterogeneity level was identified via a post-hoc assessment. 
 Heterogeneity of reasoning scripts within dyads (dyadic heterogeneity). We defined 
heterogeneity of dyadic composition by comparing dyadic members’ problem-solving scripts 
that were measured initially during the card sorting task that preceded the problem-solving 
phase. During the card sorting phase, students participated individually. First, they were 
presented the practice-related problem case described above. Then they were asked to use a 






processes they would perform while solving the presented problem. The eight epistemic 
processes from Fischer et al. (2014) and five additionally selected “distractor” processes (e.g., 
“Giving feedback”, “Improvising”) were written on the cards that were presented to the 
participants. Besides that, five blank cards were provided to give participants the opportunity 
to note down further processes if they wanted to. From the resulting process sequences, 
participants’ problem-solving scripts were coded according in the following way: We 
summed those epistemic process cards representing processes from the Fischer et al. (2014) 
model that were selected by both dyadic members. This number represented their shared 
knowledge component index (SKCI) on scientific reasoning. Then, we calculated a 
disagreement on position index (DPI) between dyadic members by calculating how many out 
of the epistemic processes they agreed on (SKCI) would need to be switched in position so as 
both members’ selection shows the same sequence of the shared epistemic processes on 
scientific reasoning. We also calculated a pooled knowledge component index (PKCI) on 
scientific inquiry by summing the number of epistemic processes of the Fischer et al. (2014) 
model that at least one dyadic member had selected. Finally, a homogeneity index was 
calculated as (SKCI - DPI)/PKCI to account for agreements and, at the same time controlling 
for disagreements between the two members of a group. Larger values of this index indicated 
more dyadic homogeneity, while lower values indicated more dyadic heterogeneity.  
7.7.4. Dependent Variables 
Dependent variables were collected during the problem-solving phase that had 
students (dyads or individuals) solve the aforementioned authentic problem from their future 
professional practice (see above). To make SR processes accessible for research, we asked 
students in the individual condition to think aloud and students in the dyadic conditions to 






All verbal data were transcribed. Before coding, we segmented the transcribed data 
into syntactical proposition-sized units (Chi, 1997). 10% of the data was independently 
segmented by two researchers after a training on segmentation. Reliability was calculated as 
the proportion of agreement according to Strijbos, Martens, Prins, & Jochems (2006). Thus, to 
more precisely detect reliability, agreements were computed from both segmenters’ 
perspective: In 85.09% out of the total number of segment boundary indicated by Segmenter 
1, Segmenter 2 also agreed that there is a segment boundary. At the same time, in 79.73% out 
of the total number of segments indicated by Segmenter 2, Segmenter 1 also indicated a 
segment boundary. These values indicated the reliability of the segmentation scheme. In a 
next step, one of the segmenters segmented the remaining data. We developed coding 
schemes to assess students’ engagement in (a) use of scientific theories and evidence and (b) 
epistemic processes of scientific reasoning. 
Use of scientific theories and evidence. A second coding scheme was developed to 
capture for each segment whether or not participants used scientific theories and/or evidence 
or not. Segments were coded as “use of scientific theories and evidence”” if the speaker 
referred to scientific theories, concepts or methods. Specifically, we used the following five 
categories: “Learning strategy” was applied when participants mentioned  ways of processing 
the learning material (“Elaborated strategy”; “Recollection difficulties”) related topics. 
“Anxiety” was applied when participants referred to test anxiety or emotional pressure. 
“Motivation” was used when participants talked about motivation. As the last scientific 
content code we used the category “Other” such as “Self-fulfilling prophecy”; “Mobbing”; 
“Mind-map”. If the above codes did not apply, the segment was coded as non-scientific 
content related. For each transcript (individual or dyadic), we merged all content categories to 






value with the total number of propositions in order to calculate our variable for the analyses. 
5% of the segments were coded by two independent coders with an agreement of Cohen’s 
κ=.82.  
Epistemic processes. All segments were coded by aid of a coding scheme (see Table 
1) developed to capture the eight epistemic processes of scientific reasoning proposed by 
Fischer et al. (2014) or non-epistemic propositions. Since it proved impossible to reliably 
differentiate between the two activities “evidence generation” and “evidence evaluation“, we 
merged these two categories into one: evidence evaluation. After the coding scheme had been 
developed and trained, two independent coders coded 10% of the data for the identification of 
epistemic processes. Inter-rater reliability was sufficient (Cohen’s κ = .68). After coding each 
segment, the numbers of segments that fell in the same category were summed for each 
epistemic process: problem identification (PI), questioning (Q), hypothesis generation (HG), 
generating solutions (GS), evidence evaluation (EE), drawing conclusions (DC), 
communicating and scrutinizing (CS), and non-epistemic proposition (NE). Each resulting 
sum scores were divided by total talk to include in the statistical analyses. Finally, as the data 
screening (see below) revealed that three epistemic processes (problem identification, 
questioning and drawing conclusions had relatively large non-coded ratio, we dummy-coded 
these variables by assigning 0 if there was no proposition coded under the given epistemic 












Coding Scheme to Capture Epistemic processes of Scientific Reasoning.   
Code for Epistemic 
process 











Evidence generation (EG) 












Evidence evaluation (EE) 
(later merged with EG) 
 












An initial attempt to build an 
understanding of the 
problem. 
 
A question or statement 
orienting further inquiry. 
 
Any explanation of the 
problem case. 
 
Referring to case 
information;  
 
to scientific evidence;  
 
to anecdotal evidence;  
 
 
to lack of information;  
 
or planning further 
information collection.  
 
Evaluation of evidence (to 
support / falsify HG or CA. 
 
Planning an intervention, 
how to solve the problem. 
 
Planning to engage others in 
the inquiry process.  
 
Concluding the outcomes of 
the earlier steps of inquiry. 
 
 
Propositions that cannot be 
coded under the other codes.  
"So it is about a student, // who 
has low grades" 
 
 
"Ok, so what is the reason for 
that?" 
 
"So if the reason is her learning 
method"  
 
"She studies diligently at home"  
 
"There are different learning 
strategies…"  
 
"I know someone who has exam 
nerves" 
 
"We also do not know her age." 
 
[to find out] "how much time she 
needs to do her homework. " 
 
"and then you can even exclude 
the problem of exam nerves" 
 
"You should discourage her from 
using surface strategies" 
 
"You can also talk to the 
parents" 
 
"For me these would be the most 
important points to understand at 
all what her problem is." 
 







7.7.5. Statistical Analyses 
 To answer the question whether dyads differ from individuals on their engagement in 
their use scientific theories and evidence and in their engagement in epistemic processes 
(RQ1) ANOVAs and a MANOVA were conducted. For solution generation a Welch-test was 
conducted. For the dummy-coded variables on epistemic processes of problem identification, 
questioning and drawing conclusion, chi-square tests were applied.  
 To answer the question if dyadic heterogeneity has an effect on preservice teachers’ 
use of scientific theories and evidence and their engagement in epistemic processes (RQ2), we 
analyzed only data that came from dyads and conducted linear regressions with “dyadic 
heterogeneity” as predictor and “use of scientific theories and evidence” as well as 
“engagement in SR activities” as criterion variables. For problem identification, questioning 
and drawing conclusion logistic regressions were conducted. 
 For all analyses, the unit of analysis was the transcript, no matter whether it came from 
an individual or a dyad. I.e., transcripts from individual think-aloud transcripts were 
compared with transcripts from dyadic discussions.   
 For all analyses, the alpha level was set to p < .05. 
7.8. Results 
7.8.1. Data Screening and Diagnostic Statistics 
 For the first analysis (effect of reasoning setting on scientific content use), z-scores for 
skewness and kurtosis were calculated (Gardiner & Robinson, 2009, pp. 138–139) to 
investigate the normality distribution within the groups of comparison. Dyads showed a 
positively skewed (z = 3.87) as well as a leptokurtic (z = 4.80) deviation from normality. Data 
screening indicated one outlier case (z = 3.50), that also accounted for the skewness in the 






(Osborne & Overbay, 2004). However, Levene’s test indicated unequal variances between 
individuals and dyads (p < .05), therefore a Welch’s F-test was conducted due to its 
robustness (i.e., its affordance to keep Type I error at a satisfactory level) for the violation of 
homogeneity of variances in case of unequal sample sizes (Field, 2009, p. 379-380; Grissom, 
2000). 
 For the second analysis (effect of reasoning setting on engagement in epistemic 
processes), Mahalanobis distances did not indicate multivariate outliers (p ≥ .03). Bivariate 
scatterplots indicated linearity among most of the epistemic processes. The frequency 
distributions of three epistemic processes, however, suggested very high frequencies of 
missing values for the variables drawing conclusions (67.39%), questioning (58.70%) and 
problem identification (39.13%). Consequently, we decided to exclude these variables from 
further parametric analyses, rather including them as dummy-coded variables in alternative 
statistical tests (see above). Data screening showed no outliers for the remaining epistemic 
processes, neither for individuals nor for dyads (z ≤ 2.85). Z-scores for skewness and kurtosis 
did not indicate a violation of normality for epistemic processes in case of dyads (z ≤ 2.07). 
Bartlett’s sphericity test showed the expected covariance among the remaining epistemic 
processes, Approx. χ²(10) = 88.25, p < .001. Testing multicollinearity showed only one very 
high (│r│ > .8) negative bivariate correlation between solution generation and evidence 
evaluation in case of individuals, r(15) = - .87. However, since these two variables were not 
redundant for dyads, and we did not have a theoretical reason to exclude either of them from 
the analysis, rather to include both, we decided to run one analysis with both variables instead 
of two separate analyses with each. Box’s test suggested equal covariance matrices (p = .05). 
Finally, Levene’s test suggested equal variances in case of epistemic processes except for 






.05). Considering the assumption checks, we decided to conduct MANOVA with a robust 
statistic, such as Pillai’s trace (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006, p. 378). Also, we calculated 
Welch’s F-test as a follow-up test for solution generation (Field, 2009).  
 For the third analysis (effect of dyadic heterogeneity on the use of scientific theories 
and evidence), z-scores for skewness and kurtosis indicated no deviation from normality for 
the distribution of dyadic heterogeneity (│z│ < .07). As for scientific content use, the 
abovementioned outlier case was removed from the analysis. No further violation of the 
assumptions were found.  
 For the fourth analysis (effect of dyadic heterogeneity on the engagement in epistemic 
processes), we excluded the variable non-epistemic propositions from multivariate analysis 
due to its curvilinear relationship with dyadic heterogeneity. As for the univariate effects, the 
casewise diagnostics did not reveal any influential cases (ŷ ≤ .16) or residual outliers out of a 
standardized residual boundary of │z│=3.  
7.8.2. Results 
RQ1: Do dyads of preservice teachers differ from individual preservice teachers in the extent 
to which they (a) refer to scientific theories and evidence and (b) in their engagement in 
different epistemic processes of scientific reasoning?  
To answer the question whether dyads differ from individuals with respect to the 
extent to which they refer to scientific theories and evidence, a Welch’s F-test was conducted 
with scientific content use as the dependent variable and reasoning setting as the independent 
variable. Reasoning setting showed a significant effect on the use of scientific theories and 
evidence, Welch’s F(1, 23.51) = 2.64, p < .05, partial η² = .17 (see Figure 6). Individuals 
referred proportionally more (M=.44, SD=.20) to scientific content than dyads (M=.29, 


















































Figure 6. Use of scientific theories and evidence by individuals and dyads. Engagement was 
measured by the proportion of propositions to overall talk (here expressed as %). Error bars 
denote standard error around the mean. 
 
Furthermore, to answer the question whether dyads differ from individuals on their 
engagement in epistemic processes, a MANOVA was conducted with the seven epistemic 
processes and non-epistemic propositions as dependent variables while reasoning setting 
(individual vs. dyadic) was included as the independent variable. Reasoning setting had a 
significant strong multivariate effect on the engagement in epistemic processes, Pillai’s trace 
= .40, F(5,40) = 5.26, p < .001, partial η² = .40. 
 Follow-up ANOVA-s and a Welch’s t-test for solution generation revealed significant 
effects of reasoning setting on the engagement in hypothesis generation, F(1,44) = 6.06, p < 







































solution generation, Welch’s F(1, 19.79) = 6.56, p < .05, 95%, partial η² = .17; as well as on 
non-epistemic propositions, F(1,44) = 10.48, p < .01, partial η² = .19. Figure 7 demonstrates 
the results. Dyads engaged more in hypotheses generation (M = .24, SD = .09) than 
individuals did (M = .17, SD = .11); they also engaged more in evidence evaluation (M = .33, 
SD = .11) than individuals (M = .26, SD = .13); and they made more non-epistemic 
propositions (M = .06, SD = .04) than individuals (M = .02, SD = .03). Yet, individuals 
engaged more in solution generation (M = .45, SD = .24) than dyads (M = .29, SD = .13).  
 Finally, a chi-square test indicated a significant relationship between reasoning setting 
and engagement in drawing conclusions, χ²(1) = 4.51, p < .05. The odds of engaging in 
drawing conclusions were 5.43 times higher for dyads than it was for individuals. No further 











Figure 7. Engagement in epistemic processes (for epistemic processes corresponding to 






proportion of propositions to overall talk (here expressed as %). Error bars denote standard 
error around the mean. 
 
 RQ2: Within dyads, does heterogeneity regarding group members’ problem-solving 
scripts affect the extent to which dyads of preservice teachers (a) refer to scientific theories 
and evidence and (b) engage in different epistemic processes of scientific reasoning? 
 To answer the question if dyadic heterogeneity has an effect on preservice teachers’ 
engagement in scientific content use, we conducted a linear regression analysis with dyadic 
heterogeneity as the predictor and scientific content use as the criterion variable. Dyadic 
heterogeneity did not predict significantly the use of scientific theories and evidence,  B = -
.17, 95% CIB = [-.65; .31], β = -.14, p = .47, R² = .02, adj R² = -.02.  
 To answer the question whether dyadic heterogeneity had an effect on the engagement 
in epistemic processes, separate linear regression analyses were conducted that included the 
dyadic heterogeneity as a predictor and  solution generation, hypothesis generation, evidence 
evaluation, communicating and scrutinizing separately as criterion variables. The regression 
models revealed that dyadic heterogeneity significantly and positively predicted solution 
generation, B = .49, 95% CIB = [.11; .86], β = .45, p < .05, R² = .20, adj R² = .17. The more 
heterogeneous dyads were the less they engaged in generating solutions. Moreover, dyadic 
heterogeneity negatively, yet, non-significantly predicted the following epistemic processes: 
hypothesis generation, B = -.17, 95% CIB = [-.46; .11], β = -.23, p = .22, R² = .05, adj R² = 
.02; evidence evaluation, B = -.25, 95% CIB = [-.60; .09], β = -.27, p = .14, R² = .08, adj R² = 
.04; and communicating and scrutinizing, B = -.04, 95% CIB = [-.15; .07], β = -.14, p = .46, R² 
= .02, adj R² = -.02. To see whether dyadic heterogeneity has an effect on the overall 






epistemic processes of generating hypothesis and evaluating evidence and regressed this 
summed value on dyadic heterogeneity. Dyadic heterogeneity significantly and negatively 
predicted the summed engagement in generating hypotheses and evaluating evidence, B = -
.43, 95% CIB = [-.79; -.06], β = -.42, p < .05, R² = .17, adj R² = .14. Finally, logistic 
regressions suggested no effect of dyadic heterogeneity on problem identification, questioning 
or on drawing conclusion.   
7.9. Discussion 
7.9.1. General discussion 
 The first aim of our study was to find an empirical answer to the question whether 
asking future practitioners (pre-service teachers) to collaborate is a useful way to engage them 
in scientific reasoning when they solve problems from their future profession. Moreover, we 
were interested in if accounting for group composition during that collaboration, i.e., 
regarding collaborating partners’ problem solving scripts, can bring an additional advantage 
that might positively affect collaborative scientific reasoning. To be able to answer these 
questions, we differentiated between content and process aspects of scientific reasoning. So 
far there is a lack of empirical evidence to draw any conclusion whether pairing teachers 
could be advantageous for engaging them in scientific reasoning while solving pedagogical 
problems. Besides the theoretical predictions (e.g., Chi, 2009), empirical research on 
collaborative learning reported that groups might do better on problem solving than individual 
reasoners (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011), while unshared ideas (Stasser & Titus, 1985) or 
coordination difficulties (e.g., Weinberger, Stegmann & Fischer, 2010) may limit their 
potentials. In accordance, qualitative research with preservice teachers (Baeten & Simons, 
2014; Nokes et al., 2008) and research on scientific reasoning (e.g., Okada & Simon, 1997) 






engagement in epistemic processes such as hypothesis generation or evidence evaluation 
compared to individual reasoning. Finally, empirical research on problem solving suggest that 
group composition might positively affect collaborative problem solving (Bowers et al., 2000; 
Wiley et al., 2013) while heterogeneity of dyads may also result in an increased need to 
coordinate with each other (Bullough et al., 2002; Rummel & Spada, 2005).  
RQ1: Do dyads of preservice teachers differ from individual preservice teachers in the extent 
to which they (a) refer to scientific theories and evidence and (b) in their engagement in 
different epistemic processes of scientific reasoning? 
 The first main finding of our study on the content aspect of scientific reasoning 
suggests that although pairs of teacher students might bring diverse knowledge on scientific 
theories and evidence to solve the problem, they do not seem to talk more about that. In the 
opposite, in our study dyads engaged proportionally less in discussing scientific theories and 
evidence than individuals did. One possible explanation of this finding is that dyads might be 
hesitant to discuss unshared content knowledge with each other (Stasser & Titus, 1985), and 
instead, they discuss content that is familiar for both of them. In a collaborative context, there 
are different cognitive and motivational aspects that might account for the engagement in 
discussing unshared knowledge (e.g., Paulus, 2000). Studies report that teacher students are 
typically not prepared for collaborating with each other (Baeten & Simons, 2014; Shin, Lee, 
& McKenna, 2016) . Therefore, it is plausible that in a collaborative situation the commonly 
known content can be a more “convenient” choice for them in the sense that it can help them 
to establish a joint understanding of the problem (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995) and hence, 
serve as a good basis for further collaboration. Such epistemic “closure”, however, has its 
own costs such as not going beyond shared knowledge, even if this knowledge does not stem 






 In opposition to the results above, our second main finding on the process aspect of 
scientific reasoning was that dyads of pre-service teachers engaged more in epistemic 
processes of hypothesis generation (explaining the problem) and evidence evaluation than 
individuals did. Moreover, dyads were also more likely to draw final conclusions and to sum 
up their reasoning processes. These findings are not only consistent with prior research on 
scientific reasoning (e.g. Okada and Simon, 1997), but also with the theoretical assumptions 
of Fischer et al. (2014). Namely, that epistemic processes typically captured in scientific 
inquiry tasks (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Okada & Simon, 1997) can be generalized to a 
professional problem solving context. In other words, the scientific quality of professional 
problem solving seems to benefit from collaboration. Collaborating teachers can be more 
reflective and evaluative compared to individual practitioners, such as earlier qualitative 
findings in team-teaching also suggest (Baeten & Simons, 2014; Nokes et al., 2008).  
 This might come, however, at the cost of engaging less in generating solutions to the 
problem. Comparing this finding with the previous one on reasoning processes, it seems that 
there is a trade-off between explanatory and solution processes when comparing collaborative 
and individual problem solving. It appears that the lower engagement in solution generation in 
case of dyads can be explained by their enhanced engagement in hypothesis generation and 
evidence evaluation. One explanation is that the epistemic processes of giving explanations, 
referring to evidence and sum up the discussion reflect to the epistemic need to coordinate 
between reasoning partners to develop a better (shared) understanding of the problem 
(Rummel & Spada, 2005). As Okada and Simon (1997) argue, that in a collaborative situation 
reasoners must be often more explicit to communicate their point to make their partner 
understand and/or accept their ideas. Furthermore, it is also possible that although an 






reasoning partners, a decreased involvement in solution generation might also reflect different 
epistemic aims or criteria (e.g., enhanced need for validity) that may surface while discussing 
with others as compared to thinking about the problem individually. Further studies could 
potentially extend on our work by investigating whether (pre-service) teachers might indeed 
have different epistemic criteria when solving problems than individual teachers and to what 
extent that might influence their problem solving processes and outcomes.  
 
RQ2: Within dyads, does heterogeneity regarding group members’ problem-solving scripts 
affect the extent to which dyads of preservice teachers (a) refer to scientific theories and 
evidence and (b) engage in different epistemic processes of scientific reasoning? 
Based on earlier findings (Bowers et al., 2000), we assumed that collaborative problem 
solving might benefit from dyadic members’ heterogeneous problem solving scripts, while 
script heterogeneity might also lead to increased coordination demands for dyads.  
 As for the content aspect of scientific reasoning, dyadic heterogeneity on collaborating 
partners’ problem solving scripts did not seem to affect the use of scientific theories and 
evidence. Considering the results between individuals and dyads it is possible that dyadic 
heterogeneity did not show an impact of using scientific content for similar reasons. Namely, 
although members of the groups may bring unique knowledge to a group discussion, groups 
might tend not to share that knowledge during collaboration (Stasser & Titus, 1985) without 
further help.   
 On the other hand, as for the process aspect of scientific reasoning, the more dyadic 
members differed from each other on their problem solving strategy, the less they discussed 
possible intervention or solution plans to alleviate the problem. Furthermore, although dyadic 






hypothesis generation and evidence evaluation revealed that the more heterogeneous the 
dyads are the more they engage in “explanatory behavior”. The summated results on 
hypothesizing and evaluating evidence are in accordance with previous findings that dyadic 
heterogeneity might be beneficial in case of complex problem solving tasks (Bowers et al., 
2000; Wiley et al., 2013), and they might explain why more heterogeneous dyads focused less 
on the solutions: as they spent more “effort” on explaining the problem. The patterns of these 
findings reflect on the individual vs group differences in scientific reasoning processes. This 
serves as a strong (although limited: see below) evidence that problem-solving scripts might 
indeed moderate group processes (Fischer et al., 2013). Thus, diverse problem solving 
approaches of future professionals can be expected to result in more reflective (explanatory 
and evaluative) practices. 
 There are, of course, further explanations for the phenomenon that dyadic diversity 
seemed to have an impact on the process aspect of scientific reasoning while it did not seem 
to affect the content aspect of it. Studies indicate that these two aspects (i.e., content and 
process) of reasoning might be rather diverse constructs (Mullins et al., 2011; Rittle-Johnson 
et al., 2001; Zimmerman, 2000). It is therefore possible that, while dyadic heterogeneity 
measured as process knowledge (problem-solving scripts) affect the analogous (i.e., the 
process) aspect of scientific reasoning, it may have a rather small impact on its non-analogous 
(i.e., the content) aspect.  
7.9.2. Limitations and conclusions 
The present study investigated the impact of collaboration and dyadic heterogeneity on pre-
service teachers’ engagement in scientific reasoning while solving educational problems. We 
meaningfully differentiated between process and content aspects of scientific reasoning (e.g., 






Generally speaking, our findings demonstrated that collaboration can be useful for scientific 
reasoning not only for solving scientific problems (Okada & Simon, 1997) but also for future 
professionals solving professional problems (Fischer et al., 2013). Yet, depending on the 
professional skills considered to be acquired, curricula may need to consider further 
educational support. A task where future professionals (pre-service teachers) need to 
collaborate can be beneficial for engaging them in developing hypotheses or evaluating 
evidence (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Okada & Simon, 1997). Also, they may be more likely to 
draw conclusions together than individually. These results suggest that situating pre-service 
teachers in a collaborative problem solving context can help them to practice the skills they 
might need to become reflective practitioners. On the other hand, without further instructions 
this increased reflectivity might not guarantee at the same time an increased reference to 
scientific content. In addition, dyads may consider potential solutions to the problem to a 
lesser extent than individual reasoners.  
These results have further implications how to set up collaborative learning sessions 
during the curricula. First, dyadic reasoning seems to spontaneously develop in a positive 
direction regarding engaging in generating hypotheses and evaluating evidence. Therefore, we 
suggest that in a first phase (exploratory phase), groups may work on their own without 
further instructions in order to develop explanations and consider supporting / contradicting 
evidence. After this initial phase groups may receive scaffolds for ensuring the quality of 
reasoning by referring to scientific content (content quality phase), e.g., by asking groups to 
revise their explanations and the evidence they used so as it considers to a greater extent 
scientific concepts, theories and evidence. Third, groups can be prompted to develop solution 
plans considering at least those explanations that they find the most relevant for explaining 






developing arguments about the limitations of their explanations and solutions regarding the 
evidence they have and whether further evidence generation would be necessary to make sure 
they can solve the problem (conclusion phase). Such partially scaffolded phases of 
collaborative problem solving could potentially bring a great advantage for scientific 
reasoning compared to individual problem solving. However, further empirical research could 
clarify to what extent these phases are useful and what could be an optimal level (e.g., Fischer 
et al., 2013) of scaffolding groups.     
One of the main limitation of our study is that we did not measure prior content 
knowledge; therefore our conclusions regarding the results on the individual advantage on 
referring to scientific theories and evidence is limited: we cannot claim it with certainty that it 
results from dyads’ focus on shared knowledge vs unique knowledge, neither that such focus 
emerges from an increased need of knowledge coordination. Future studies therefore should 
more systematically investigate the impact of cognitive and social factors during collaborative 
reasoning on the varying outcomes of scientific reasoning content and processes.   
 A main novelty of our study was to empirically demonstrate how dyadic heterogeneity 
regarding its members’ problem-solving scripts can affect the epistemic behavior of dyads 
during solving a problem. The results suggest that evidence-based teaching might benefit 
from heterogeneous group constellation of pre-service teachers. On the other hand, pre-
service teachers with diverse problem-solving approaches might need further instructional 
help to build on that advantage and generate solutions based on the hypotheses and evidence 
they have developed. Yet, more studies are necessary to understand in detail the effect of 
group heterogeneity on pre-service teachers’ scientific reasoning processes. For example, 
while our results may be generalizable to co-teaching, bigger teams of pre-service teachers 






 Finally, the results show predictive validity of problem-solving script measurement in 
case of the process aspect of scientific reasoning. Similarly, the nonsignificant results with the 
content aspect may indicate divergent validity if we consider that process and content aspects 
are considered as diverse (yet, not necessarily unrelated) constructs (Rittle-Johnson et al., 
2001; Zimmerman, 2000). Still, further studies are essential to be able to assess the construct 















8. Study 2: Collaborative and Individual Scientific Reasoning of Pre-






When assessing scientific reasoning both (1) modeling connections in the discourse and (2) 
doing so at an appropriate grain size can be challenging for researchers. Our study suggests 
combining a novel theoretical (Fischer et al., 2014) and a novel methodological (Shaffer et al., 
2006) framework to respond to these challenges by detecting epistemic networks of scientific 
reasoning processes in the context of collaborative vs individual problem solving of pre-
service teachers. We investigated (1) whether the combination of these frameworks can be 
fruitfully applied to model scientific reasoning processes and (2) what unit of analysis 
researchers or instructors should choose to answer questions of interest. One novel aspect of 
our study is that we compared epistemic networks in case of collaborative vs individual 
reasoning processes. Our results show that (1) epistemic networks of scientific reasoning can 
reliably capture reasoning processes when comparing collaborative vs individual reasoning; 
and (2) propositional and potentially larger units might be considered as “optimal” units of 
analysis to detect such differences. 
Keywords: collaborative problem solving, epistemic network analysis, scientific reasoning  
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Assessment of scientific reasoning in process data is a critical for the development of 
appropriate learning support. Although many fruitful approaches have been developed for the 
evaluation of reasoning and argumentation (Brown, Furtak, Timms, Nagashima, & Wilson, 
2010); general theoretical and methodological frameworks that allow analysis of scientific 
reasoning patterns on multiple layers (e.g., Chi, 1997) are scarce. Consequently, the selection 
of grain size at an early stage of the analysis and a resulting dilemma surrounding creation of 
larger units that allow further interpretation of the data (e.g., Weinberger & Fischer, 2006) 
often limit the generalizability of findings (Chi, 1997; Stegmann & Fischer, 2011). Also, 
using a pre-defined selection of a unit of analysis might cause difficulties when a researcher 
or a tutor would like to be more conclusive about the reasoning processes: simultaneously 
making qualitative and quantitative assessments. For example, a researcher (or tutor) may be 
interested in ideas, or codes, at a very fine grained (e.g., propositional) level in order to detect 
“elementary” units of reasoning processes. Meanwhile, she might be also interested in the 
connections, or relationships, between these ideas or codes captured at that fine-grained level, 
in order to assess the quality of reasoning processes (Chi, 1997; Weinberger & Fischer, 2006). 
Moreover, when aggregating data into larger chunks, what would be an optimal choice? 
Would combining multiple propositions or defining a larger, e.g. sentence units, lead to better 
representation of reasoning processes? The present study investigates whether a combination 
of a novel theoretical framework on scientific reasoning (Fischer et al., 2014) as well as a 
novel methodological approach on modelling reasoners’ epistemic networks (Shaffer, 2006) 
can be meaningfully combined 1) to analyze patterns (epistemic networks) of scientific 
reasoning and 2) to disambiguate the question on grain size selection and data aggregation 






8.3. Scientific reasoning and argumentation 
There are different theoretical frameworks to conceptualize and analyze scientific reasoning. 
Many follow a “structural” approach, focusing on the structure of argumentation (see Brown 
et al., 2010) while others emphasize the role of engagement in scientific reasoning processes 
(Okada & Simon, 1997). Our work belongs to the latter stream of research understanding 
scientific reasoning as engagement of individuals or groups in a sequence of epistemic 
processes (Fischer et al., 2013). According to this model, scientific reasoning involves 
reasoners identifying an existing problem (Problem identification), articulating questions of 
how to proceed with their reasoning processes (Questioning), derive possible explanations of 
the problem (Hypothesis generation), construct artifacts, such as intervention plans, to solve 
the problem (Generating solutions), generate and collect information (Evidence generation), 
evaluate that information (Evidence evaluation), engage others in the reasoning process 
(Communicating & scrutinizing), and draw conclusions (Drawing conclusions). Earlier 
studies found that both individual and collaborative reasoning in a professional problem 
solving context can be reliably coded using this framework (Csanadi, Kollar & Fischer, 
2016).  
8.4. Collaborative vs. individual scientific reasoning processes 
Collaborative scientific reasoning has the potential to lead individuals to higher engagement 
in epistemic processes such as hypothesis generation and evidence evaluation compared to 
reasoning alone (Okada & Simon, 1997; Teasley, 1995). Similarly, more recent findings 
(Csanadi et al., 2016) showed that when pre-service teachers solved a problem from their 
future practice as dyads, they engaged more in hypothesis generation (i.e., trying to find an 
explanation to the problem) but less in generating solutions than individuals did. 






certain codes has clear constraints. Most importantly, it cannot be conclusive enough 
regarding the patterns of epistemic processes that can characterize collaborative vs individual 
reasoning. For example, although dyads were found to be more explanatory, indicated by a 
higher engagement in hypothesizing, whether they did this in a more evidence-based manner 
(i.e. if they made more connections between hypothesizing and evaluating evidence) remained 
unclear. Being able to identify such connections or patterns in the data is, therefore, important 
for assessing quality aspects of scientific reasoning. 
8.5. Selection of grain size and data aggregation to capture patterns of reasoning 
To assess and compare reasoners with respect to the patterns of the epistemic processes they 
engage in, researchers should find answers to two related questions. First, what is an 
appropriate grain size (i.e., unit of analysis) and second, how should coded data be aggregated 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of the quality and features of the reasoning processes. 
Many researchers emphasize that data segmentation should be a separate and preceding step 
to coding (Chi, 1997; Strijbos, Martens, Prins & Jochems, 2006). This would mean that the 
division of verbal data into chunks that carry meaningful information for further analysis 
should precede further analyses. However, this early selection of the unit of analysis has its 
limitations (e.g., Chi, 1997). Especially the use of smaller grain sizes (e.g., propositional unit) 
allow for a more fine-grained analysis of reasoning processes (e.g., to interpret the relation 
between independent clauses of compound sentences) and allow for frequency-based 
analyses. Indeed, many quantitative approaches to the analysis of scientific reasoning 
processes (e.g., Okada & Simon, 1997) suggest analyzing frequencies of single categories. 
However, considering that discourse moves are not unrelated to each other, relying on solely 
frequency-based information of data can lead to missing meaningful patterns of discourse 






Fischer, 2011), i.e., how the researcher/tutor can make higher level inferences based on data 
coded at a lower grain size, often generates uncertainty. When looking for relationships 
between coded units (e.g., propositions), how far these units can fall from each other? Can we 
meaningfully detect relationships between two neighboring units or does allowing for slightly 
“longer distance” connections increase explanatory power? A method that allows more 
adaptable choice of grain size (Siebert-Evenstone et al., 2016), such as considering multiple 
units of analysis instead of relying on a pre-defined selection in order to model scientific 
reasoning could help to answer such questions.  
 Another issue associated with coding-independent segmentation may arise if some 
codes turn out to be highly frequent ones while others occur relatively rarely. “Uneven” 
frequency distributions can bias further analyses of the dataset (e.g., Csanadi, Daxenberger, 
Ghanem, Kollar, Fischer & Gurevych, 2016). For example, high frequency codes might 
generate many connections with each other while also being related to many other codes. On 
the other hand, low frequency codes may lack enough connections with other codes to 
demonstrate the power to discriminate between epistemic networks of different groups (e.g., 
dyads vs individuals). Thus, in case of modeling reasoning processes, this can mean that some 
reasoning patterns may emerge as mere artifacts while other connections in the data may 
remain undetected, and therefore, models of scientific reasoning should account for such 
limitations.  
 To summarize, using a hierarchical segmentation procedure and reliance on solely 
frequency-related information when analyzing scientific reasoning processes and comparing 
reasoners, leaves open the questions of (1) how to aggregate and identify meaningful larger 
patterns in the data that can (2) help more validly capture the reasoning performance beyond 






8.6. Epistemic Network Analysis: A Method to Analyze (Multiple Scopes of) 
Scientific Reasoning 
One solution of the abovementioned problems can be to code on multiple levels of granularity 
(Stegmann & Fischer, 2011). As Chi (1997) notes, this approach has the advantage of leading 
to more reliable results and interpretations at different levels. Generally speaking, 
segmentation might be a matter of the researchers’ focus of interest (Chi, 1997), the 
theoretical framework they apply (Clara & Mauri, 2010), the nature of data (e.g. synchronous 
vs asynchronous discussions) and more. Still, selecting multiple levels of analysis can 
contribute to more valid interpretations about the data (Chi, 1997; Weinberger & Fischer, 
2006) as different lenses may capture different aspects of collaborative learning and reasoning 
processes.   
 Epistemic Network Analysis (ENA; Shaffer, 2006) is a method to identify meaningful 
and quantifiable patterns in discourse/reasoning. It can provide an alternative to the 
widespread “code and count” approach. ENA moves beyond the traditional frequency-based 
assessments by examining the structure of the co-occurrence, or connections in coded data. 
Moreover, compared to other methodological approaches, e.g., sequential analysis (see in 
Cress & Hesse, 2013), ENA has the novelty of (1) modeling whole networks of connections 
and (2) it affords both quantitative and qualitative comparisons between different network 
models.   
 A main theoretical assumption of ENA is that repeated co-occurrences of two or more 
codes in the discourse can reveal epistemic networks which characterize an underlying 
Discourse (Gee, 1999; Collier et al., 2016), e.g., to collaborative (vs. individual) scientific 
reasoning. To identify a unit of analysis for calculating such co-occurrences, ENA provides an 






The term stanza window refers a window or scope within which ENA is searching for 
connections. This means that a MSWS=1 allows search for connections only between a 
proposition of reference and its preceding proposition. Therefore, a MSWS=1 results in 
connections only between neighboring propositions. A MSWS=2, however, allows one 
further step: it allows connection between a proposition of reference and the two preceding 
propositions. By changing MSWS from smaller values to larger it is possible to open the 
“search window” from very narrow context to wider ones. As a result, the researcher or tutor 
can look for connections not only within propositions (as in case of “coding and counting” 
approaches) or between neighboring propositions, but even between propositions that are two, 
three or more steps further from each other in the discourse. In short, it offers the advantage of 
multiple scopes for analysis. Here we aim to investigate if ENA can reveal some 
characteristics of collaborative (compared to individual) scientific reasoning processes as well 
as to articulate what grain sizes should be considered when using ENA for that analysis.  
 Furthermore, ENA provides the opportunity to quantitatively and qualitatively 
compare different epistemic network models with each other. Quantitative comparison is 
possible by using calculated centroids for every epistemic networks generated by ENA. Such 
centroid values are determined by the strength of connections between nodes in the epistemic 
network. Nodes are the codes (such as epistemic processes, see below) while the strength of 
connections between them are generated based on their local co-occurrences (within each 
stanza window: see above). These centroid values can be used for quantitative analyses. 
Furthermore, qualitative comparison of epistemic networks is possible using various options 
for visualization. One option is “Subtracting networks” which means contrasting two network 






“subtracted network” represents the difference between two reasoning networks and therefore, 
can illustrate what makes dyadic reasoning different from individual reasoning. 
8.7. Research questions 
RQ1: Do collaborative and individual reasoners exhibit different epistemic networks of 
scientific reasoning while solving a professional problem?  
 While earlier studies demonstrated differences between collaborative and individual 
reasoning in terms of their engagement in different epistemic processes (Csanadi et al., 2016; 
Okada & Simon, 1997), these results were mainly frequency-based. E.g., the researchers 
compared proportions as well as raw frequencies of engagement in different epistemic 
processes, such as evaluating evidence or hypothesizing. Thus, an open question is whether 
dyads also differ from individuals in the patterns of epistemic processes they engage in during 
scientific reasoning. In this study we address this question using ENA (Shaffer et. al. 2009) to 
capture meaningful patterns of co-occurrences between epistemic processes (i.e., epistemic 
networks of scientific reasoning), and to compare dyads with individual reasoners.  
 Epistemic networks can, however, also be defined based on larger speech units (e.g., 
across multiple propositions) and we can also implement larger grain sizes beyond analyzing 
neighboring propositions or within sentences. To fully answer RQ1, therefore, we 
investigated whether some grain sizes can provide potentially better explanation of patterns in 
the data than others. 
 RQ2: Do the epistemic networks we detect investigating RQ1 differ from epistemic 
networks based on the same data set that has been randomly resorted (i.e. with the same 
frequency information)? 
 ENA models co-occurrences of codes, since some codes occur more frequently than 






other codes more often than lower frequency codes. Consequently, ENA may “overestimate” 
some connections. Therefore, to answer our second research question, we compared ENA 
results from RQ1 to ENA results obtained from a dataset that contained only frequency 
information of the original discourse (see below). If the epistemic networks identified in 
relation to RQ1 cannot be explained merely by the frequency distribution of epistemic 
processes, the epistemic networks detected in relation to RQ1 should differ from the epistemic 
networks of the randomly resorted dataset. 
8.8. Method 
The data analyzed in this study is a re-analysis of process data from another study (Csanadi et 
al., 2016). In the original study N=76 preservice teachers (59 female, MAge=21.22, 
SDAge=3.98) solved a problem case from their future profession in one of two between-subject 
conditions: either as individuals (N=16) or as dyads (N=30 dyads). Think aloud and discourse 
data of their problem solving were first manually segmented into propositional units and then 
coded for further analysis. The coding scheme of that study was developed based on the 
framework of scientific reasoning by Fischer et al. (2014). Epistemic processes identified by 
the framework (see above) were applied (Table 1): Problem identification for an initial 
attempt to build an understanding of the problem; Questioning for statements or questions 
triggering further inquiry; Hypothesis generation for developing explanations of the problem; 
Evidence generation for reference to information or lack of information that could support a 
claim; Evidence Evaluation to evaluate a claim; Communicating and scrutinizing for planned 
discussions with others (e.g., in order to find out further information); Drawing conclusions 
for concluding outcomes of reasoning. Finally, the epistemic process of “Constructing 
artefacts” (in Fischer et al., 2014) was operationalized as developing interventions or solution 






Evidence generation and Evidence evaluation were merged into Evidence evaluation. Both 
segmentation (79.73% of agreement by Coder 1 and 85.09% of agreement by Coder 2) and 
coding (κ = 0.68) proved to be reliable. We used this dataset (original dataset) to analyze 
further in our present study. 
 We used the abovementioned original dataset to answer RQ1. To be able to answer 
RQ2 we created a randomized dataset in the following way. Using the original dataset within 
each dyad and individual participants we created a random sequence of the pre-segmented 
propositions (Csanadi et al., 2016). That meant, the original sequence of propositions were 
randomized while the relative frequency of propositions was preserved (no propositions were 
deleted). This new randomized dataset preserved the information of the occurrence of 
epistemic processes, yet, in a randomized order; containing the information to which 
individual or dyad the epistemic processes belong to, how frequently they occur, but without 
any information regarding their sequence in the original dataset. 
 We used ENA to identify epistemic networks of scientific reasoning in order to answer 
both RQ1 and RQ2. We built epistemic network models using ENA in four steps. First, we 
calculated co-occurrences between epistemic processes (MSWS=1, means rotation was 
applied) for dyads and for individuals. At the same time ENA automatically generated a 
centroid value for each dyad or individual that served as a numeric representation of their 
epistemic network and it was included in further analysis to compare dyadic and individual 
epistemic networks of scientific reasoning. Second, mean, or “average,” networks were 
defined for both the dyadic and the individual reasoning conditions, respectively. Each of 
these networks visually represented all the connections that participants (dyads or individuals) 
generated in the given condition. Third, we quantitatively compared epistemic networks for 






(calculated in step 1) in the two conditions. Fourth, we subtracted the mean dyadic and mean 
individual networks from each other (by using the “Subtracting networks” option in ENA). 
The resulting subtracted networks visualized what connections contributed to the difference 
between the two reasoning conditions (dyadic vs individual, calculated in step 3).  
 To be able to fully answer RQ1 regarding grain size, we sequentially set MSWS from 
1 to 7, step-by step, performing the same analysis for each stanza window size. The resulting 
epistemic network models at each MSWS level allowed us quantitative as well as qualitative 
(visual) comparisons. 
 To answer RQ2, we used the randomized dataset selecting the same parameters and 
performing the same analysis as in case of RQ1. We compared the outcomes of this analysis 
with the ENA results from RQ1. 
8.9. Results 
RQ 1: To answer RQ1, as a first step, we compared dyadic and individual networks at the 
grain size of MSWS=1 which lead to the following results. The mean centroid value for 
individuals’ epistemic networks (M=.21,SD=.32) was significantly different from the mean 
centroid value for dyads’ epistemic networks (M=-.11,SD=.21), t(44)=3.65, p<.01, d=1.32. 
Plotting epistemic networks (Figure 8) further revealed that the central epistemic process 
accounting for most of the connections was evidence evaluation. Moreover, in case of dyads 
evidence evaluation showed more complex network than in case of individuals: for dyads it 
was connected to hypothesis generation, communicating and scrutinizing, generating 
solutions and non-epistemic propositions; while in the case of individuals it was only 
connected to hypothesis generation and generating solutions. Finally, subtracting individual 






rather than evidence evaluation that played a central role in contrast to dyadic networks where 
only evidence evaluation showed multiple connections after subtraction. 
 
Figure 8. Epistemic networks of dyads (blue, left), individuals (red, right) and the difference 
between their networks (center) using the original dataset. 
 To completely answer RQ1 and in order to see whether there is an optimal grain size 
that can best capture the differences between epistemic networks of dyads and individuals, we 
compared epistemic networks at 1 ≤ MSWS ≤ 7 levels which led to the following results. All 
comparisons were statistically significant at least under p<.01. Although effect size showed a 
small increase at every MSWS level, these differences were small: the explained variance 
increased only by 5.35% (ΔR²=.05) from MSWS=1 (R²=.30) to MSWS=7 (R²=.36). Finally, a 
visual inspection of the epistemic networks conducted at 1 ≤ MSWS ≤ 7 levels suggested 
highly similar patterns at every MSWS levels (see Figure 8). 
 RQ 2: Similar to the outcomes of RQ1, when using the randomized dataset, the mean 
centroid value for individuals’ epistemic networks (M=.17,SD=.26) was significantly different 
from the mean centroid value for dyads’ epistemic networks (M=-.09,SD=.20), t(44)=3.35, 
p<.01, 95%, d=1.15. Plotting epistemic networks (Figure 9), however, revealed no visible 
difference between dyadic and individual networks. Dyadic and individual networks showed 






epistemic processes: hypothesis generation, solution generation and evidence evaluation. This 
was in clear contrast with the results of RQ1 where epistemic networks were different for 
collaborative vs individual reasoning (Figure 8). A further important difference is that Figure 
9 does not indicate any central epistemic process, neither for dyadic and individual nor for the 
subtracted pattern. Moreover, Figure 9 shows very low level of network complexity for dyads 
(connections among the highest-frequency activities) compared to Figure 8. Finally, the 
subtracted network model on Figure 9 consists of only blue lines, indicating that dyads made 
more connections among the highly frequent codes than individuals.   
 
Figure 9. Epistemic networks of dyads (blue, left), individuals (red, right) and the difference 
between their networks (center) using the randomized dataset. 
8.10. Discussion 
The two main aims of our study were (1) to see whether we can aggregate data to capture 
meaningful patterns (epistemic networks) of scientific reasoning processes regarding 
collaborative and individual reasoning (RQ1 & RQ2) and (2) to search for an optimal grain 
size, or unit of analysis, for such aggregation (RQ1). We sought to answer these questions by 
the application of a novel theoretical framework on scientific reasoning (Fischer et al., 2014) 
and a novel methodological approach on modelling epistemic networks (Shaffer, 2006).  
 The outcomes for RQ1 suggest that epistemic networks of scientific reasoning can 






specifically, dyads seemed to engage in a more complex manner in scientific reasoning 
compared to individuals: they made more connections between epistemic processes 
(specifically, with evidence evaluation). Moreover, while individual reasoning was rather 
solution-focused; dyadic reasoning seemed to be more evidence-focused. These results are 
also in accordance with previous frequency-based findings (Csanadi et al., 2016; Okada & 
Simon, 1997).  
 To be able to fully answer RQ1 we ran further analyses at different stanza window 
sizes that resulted in patterns quite similar to those in Figure 8. On the one hand, this suggests 
the robustness of our findings, on the other, a question of the optimal grain size to detect 
meaningful patterns of scientific reasoning cannot be conclusively answered. A partial answer 
is, however, that choosing larger speech unit (e.g., sentences) at a first step may represent 
reasoning patterns in the data at least closely as well as propositions do. Yet, further empirical 
research could test (1) whether this is true and if (2) varying stanza window sizes on sentence 
units would lead to different results. Based on the results of this study and considering the 
exhaustiveness of hand-coding procedure, however, choosing larger units of analysis that still 
carry the information needed to model scientific reasoning may be an efficient choice for the 
researcher/tutor.  
 The outcomes on RQ2 show that epistemic networks extracted on discourse data 
(original dataset) are likely to be valid models for the evaluation of reasoning patterns in the 
data as they are not reducible to the frequency distribution of codes. Furthermore, it is clear 
that merely frequency-information in the data resulted in only “poor” network models: 
networks represented solely the most frequent codes and their connections. Additionally, after 
subtracting those networks the results suggested that dyads made more connections 






outcomes of the earlier findings (Csanadi et al., 2016), which underlines the assumption that 
ENA conducted on real discourse data can detect meaningful patterns of scientific reasoning. 
 Finally, the results imply that identifying epistemic processes on the propositional 
level and aggregating data by conducting epistemic network analysis can offer a powerful 
way to meaningfully assess scientific reasoning in discourse. 
8.11. Final conclusions 
Our results have further important consequences.  
 First, the theoretical (Fischer et al., 2014) and the methodological (Shaffer, 2009) 
frameworks could be fruitfully combined to result in a series of robust analyses of identifying 
epistemic networks of scientific reasoning.  
 Second, dyadic vs. individual reasoning networks can be valid models of scientific 
reasoning in discourse. Yet, we need more empirical research to see if this result holds as well 
as see the predictive validity of our findings. For example, the extent to which dyads’ more 
extensive connections could potentially predict learning outcomes and whether some 
connections might play a stronger moderating role in that process, are questions for future 
research.  
 Finally, additional analyses that can more directly address the impact of frequency 
distribution of codes on epistemic networks could also contribute to conclusions regarding the 
validity of the findings. For example, alternative measures provided by ENA could account 
for “imbalanced” frequency distribution in the data. Those measures could apply, for 
example, some weighting method for assigning less weight to higher frequency codes or to 
connections among higher frequency codes, in order to reduce the chance of detecting 
artefactual connections due to higher probability of co-occurrence between high-frequency 






(similar to the outcomes on RQ2) and would allow its subtraction from the epistemic network 
model on the real dataset; that would afford the visualization of reasoning patterns beyond 
highly frequent connections. Yet, such measures should be implemented with caution: 
connections captured in the discourse should always represent connections in the Discourse 


























9. General discussion 
This chapter is concerned with the question whether the main aim of the dissertation, to find 
out whether collaboration can be a beneficial context to engage future practitioners to solve 
professional problems as scientifically knowledgeable practitioners, has been fulfilled. With 
respect to that concern, this chapter discusses how the research questions (Chapter 7) can be 
answered on the basis of the results of the two empirical studies conducted (Chapter 8 and 
Chapter 9), and accounts for the theoretical, methodological and practical implications of 
those results. 
9.1. Summary of the Studies 
The present dissertation aims to answer the question if engaging future practitioners to 
collaborate with each other while solving authentic problems from their future professional 
practice would be beneficial for them to solve problems in a scientifically knowledgeable 
manner, i.e., to reason more scientifically compared to individual problem solvers. In order to 
be able to answer that question the present work accounts for two related sub-problems. First, 
this dissertation argues that when comparing groups of reasoners with individual reasoners 
group composition (i.e., within-group heterogeneity regarding their members’ problem 
solving scripts) might moderate the findings. Second, this dissertation claims that the mere 
application of a “coding and counting” approach is not sufficient enough for measuring 
scientific reasoning and, a complementary methodological approach, i.e., Epistemic Network 
Analysis (ENA) can bring the potential to reveal a more detailed picture on the process aspect 
of scientific reasoning compared to those “coding-and-counting” approaches.  
 Studies suggest that when it comes to solving professional problems, (future) 






practitioners do such as they do not apply scientific knowledge in a systematic manner 
(Hetmanek et al, 2015; Yeh & Santagata, 2015). It indicates that future practitioners have 
difficulties with both the content and the process aspects of scientific reasoning. It is a 
reasonable assumption therefore, that asking them to collaborate while solving problems 
might foster their engagement in scientific reasoning (Okada & Simon, 1997; Rummel & 
Spada, 2005). Yet, so far there is a lack of empirical investigations in this area. Similarly, 
although heterogeneous group composition is often reported (Bowers et al., 2000; Canham et 
al., 2012) to bring benefits to problem solving; no studies have investigated so far whether 
group heterogeneity regarding prior knowledge on problem solving, i.e., problem solving 
scripts, may facilitate engagement in scientific reasoning. Finally, although previous literature 
showed that the exclusive application of the method of “coding and counting” is not an 
optimal way to analyze reasoning processes (e.g., Jeong, 2005), and that studies should focus 
on the relationship or patterns between epistemic processes or “skills” constituting scientific 
reasoning (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Suthers, 2005), previous approaches seem to be limited 
with respect to the analysis of patterns (i.e., networks) of scientific reasoning.   
 To fill the abovementioned research gaps, two studies (using the same data) with pre-
service teachers have been conducted. Both investigated the main question to what extent 
collaboration is a beneficial context to solve problems as scientifically knowledgeable 
practitioners. In addition, Study 1 (Chapter 8) investigated the effect of group heterogeneity 
regarding problem solving scripts on the engagement in scientific reasoning while Study 2 
(Chapter 9) investigated if epistemic network analysis can be an appropriate methodological 
approach to assess scientific reasoning. Additionally, the present work differentiated between 
two aspects of scientific reasoning: its content and process aspects. The following subchapters 






9.1.1. Summary of Study 1 
The first experimental study found that asking pre-service teachers to collaborate during 
solving educational problems has divergent impact on the process and the content aspects of 
scientific reasoning. To be more specific, collaboration fostered the engagement in scientific 
reasoning processes such as hypothesis generation; evidence evaluation and drawing 
conclusions. On the other hand, it decreased the engagement in generating solutions to the 
problem. Regarding the content aspect, dyads applied proportionally less scientific content 
than individuals did.  
 When investigating the effect of heterogeneity of group members’ problem solving 
scripts on the engagement in scientific reasoning, the results showed that the more 
heterogeneous the dyads were, the more they engaged in the processes of hypothesis 
generation and evidence evaluation altogether. At the same time, the more heterogeneous the 
dyads were the less they engaged in generating solutions to the problem. Dyadic 
heterogeneity did not seem to affect the content aspect of scientific reasoning in this study.  
9.1.2. Summary of Study 2 
The findings of the second study indicated that patterns of epistemic processes of scientific 
reasoning can be captured by applying the method of epistemic network analysis (ENA).  
Moreover, such patterns could differentiate between collaborative and individual reasoners. 
Network subtractions showed that the connections of evidence evaluation with hypothesis 
generation, communicating and scrutinizing as well as with non-epistemic propositions 
distinctively characterized collaborative reasoning, while the connections of solution 
generation with hypothesis generation and evidence evaluation were characteristic for 






between epistemic processes in a more interpretable manner compared to when the sequence 
of epistemic processes was randomized in each of the discourse and think aloud.      
9.2. Conclusions and Implications of the Results 
9.2.1. Conclusions of Study 1 
One of the main finding of Study 1 was that collaboration affected the process and content 
aspects of scientific reasoning differently. Reasoners’ engagement in epistemic processes of 
hypothesis generation, evaluating evidence and drawing conclusions showed increase in case 
of collaborating partners compared to individual reasoners, while solution generation 
decreased as an effect of collaboration. On the other hand, individuals referred to scientific 
content more often than collaborating partners did. 
 Regarding the main research question whether collaboration can be an beneficial 
context for engaging future practitioners in scientific reasoning, one of the main findings was 
that the collaborative context showed positive effect for the most part of the process aspect: it 
increased the engagement in epistemic processes such as hypothesis generation, evidence 
evaluation and drawing conclusions, but decreased engagement in generating solutions. The 
earlier assumptions of this dissertation indicated that a collaborative context might be 
authentic for scientific reasoning (Simon et al., 1981; Osborne, 2010) and that it might lead to 
communicational affordances such as engagement in interactive reasoning (Chi, 2009) as the 
different reasoning partners can complete and challenge each other’s thoughts (Dunbar, 1995) 
as well as the distribution of cognitive load that may otherwise impede individual problem 
solving processes (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011). It is possible that developing explanations 
(i.e., generating hypotheses) and evaluating evidence are those epistemic processes that can 
benefit the most from a collaborative reasoning context, because they might require more 






generating solutions. Further studies could potentially investigate this assumption by, for 
example, comparing the level of interactivity (Chi, 2009; Teasley, 1997) and 
argumentativeness (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2009) in case of hypothesis generation and solution 
generation. Another potential is that solving an authentic problem might have increased 
cognitive load in case of individuals but not for groups, because dyadic members could rely 
on each other’s reasoning (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011). Yet, as the present study did not 
measure cognitive load, this explanation remains speculative. Nevertheless, the results are in 
accordance with the findings of earlier studies (e.g., Okada and Simon, 1997) with respect to 
hypothesizing and generating/evaluating evidence which indicates the generalizability of 
analyzing these epistemic processes in non-scientific, i.e., practice-oriented domains. The 
similar pattern of the results compared to earlier findings (Okada & Simon, 1997; Teasley, 
1995) can also serve as an argument for the content validity of the coding instrument applied 
in this study, at least with respect to the epistemic processes of hypothesis generation and 
evidence evaluation. Moreover, the results serve as one of the first empirical demonstrations 
on how epistemic processes may occur in the “practitioners’ mode” of scientific reasoning 
and what skills might constitute “scientifically knowledgeable practice” (Fischer et al., 2014). 
Yet, further studies should be conducted in other non-scientific domains to test for the 
domain-generality of scientific reasoning processes within practical domains as well as to be 
able to draw an overall conclusion that the same epistemic processes apply for non-scientific 
as for scientific domains. 
 A further main finding regarding the process aspect of scientific reasoning was that 
collaboration affected solution generation in a negative manner. This result taken together 
with the just discussed positive effect on the other epistemic processes seems to represent a 






such as hypothesizing and evidence evaluation (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Okada & Simon, 
1997), and the epistemic process of rather practical characteristics such as generating 
solutions. This might suggest that while collaboration was characterized more by an 
explanatory-investigative epistemic focus, individual reasoning was more solution-oriented 
without necessarily elaborating on the nature of the problem. One possible explanation can be 
the idea-coordination between reasoning partners (Barron, 2000; Roschelle & Teasley, 1997; 
Okada & Simon, 1997) might account for the effect of collaboration on the increased 
engagement in explanatory-investigative processes. When solving a problem collaborating 
partners may need to coordinate their ideas in order to develop a common understanding 
about the nature of the problem (e.g., Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). This coordination within 
dyads might lead to longer discussions on the potential explanations of the problem 
(hypothesis generation) and may argue for or against their assumptions based on evidence 
(evaluating evidence). As a consequence of this increased engagement in explanatory-
investigative epistemic processes, dyads might sense it rather superfluous to engage in other 
epistemic processes such as solution generation. Yet, it is somewhat contradictory to this 
interpretation that dyads were more likely to draw conclusions than individuals were. Another 
potential explanation is that the overall process of solving complex problems might result in 
higher cognitive load for individuals who are novice problem solvers in their field (i.e., pre-
service teachers) compared to groups of novices (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011). For novice 
problem solvers it might be cognitively effortful to think about different aspects of solving the 
problem (e.g., how to progress with solving the problem, what scientific theory may be 
relevant to apply). While dyads have further resources, i.e., a reasoning partner, to cope with 
cognitively effortful questions by relying on the partner’s knowledge and contribution to the 






reasoning there is no such scaffolding opportunity to cope with an increased cognitive load. 
This lack of necessary cognitive resources might result in an epistemic focus on staying 
pragmatic and thinking about solutions more than considering potential explanations of the 
problem (generating hypotheses) and connecting those explanations to evidence (evaluating 
evidence). An interesting question to find out would be if individuals build their solutions 
based on systematic inquiry of potential explanations about the problem or if they are more 
prone to come up with solutions without building them on earlier explanations of the problem. 
Earlier studies (Chi, 2009; Dunbar, 1995; Okada & Simon, 1997; Teasley, 1997) indicate that 
the communicational affordance of collaborative (scientific) reasoning might lead to more 
reflection and an increased need between collaborating partners to explain upcoming ideas, 
e.g., for clarification, compared to individual reasoning where such communicational 
challenges do not exist. Further studies might try to find an answer to the question to what 
extent coordination attempts of dyads or lack of (self-)reflective reasoning of individuals may 
account for the trade-off effect between explanatory-justification processes and generating 
solutions.  
 Besides the abovementioned effects of collaboration on the process aspect of scientific 
reasoning, collaborative reasoning seems to affect the content aspect in a negative manner. 
Dyads applied proportionally less scientific content during problem solving than individuals 
did. It is notable that scientific reasoning did not benefit from collaboration with respect to the 
application of scientific content. One potential explanation for this result is that although 
different learning partners might have brought unique ideas (i.e., scientific knowledge) into 
the discussion, they may have focused on mutually shared knowledge (Stasser & Titus, 1985), 
for instance to reach and keep up a mutual understanding on the problem (Roschelle & 






prior scientific content knowledge was measured in this study. Thus, there is no information 
about the extent to which reasoning partners initiated their original ideas or to what extent 
they focused on shared knowledge. Another possible explanation is a more methodological 
one. Namely, that the coding scheme on scientific content use did not measure scientific 
content at the appropriate level. Specifically, although the applied coding scheme was able to 
differentiate between different scientific content areas (e.g., memory/learning; motivation; 
anxiety) in a reliable manner, these content areas were analyzed altogether without an even 
finer differentiation between content coding. For example, a lower level coding of which 
scientific theories reasoners refer to might be informative about whether collaborating 
partners might have referred to, e.g., more unique content than individuals did. Similarly, 
addressing the “appropriateness” or the quality of the reference to scientific content might 
also reveal potential benefits of groups over individuals. Therefore, by applying a rather “low 
threshold” for the operationalization and the measurement of what would count as a reference 
to scientific content (i.e., identifying and then merging scientific content areas) might not be 
the (only) valid way to capture the content aspect of scientific reasoning, i.e., the application 
of scientific knowledge. At any rate, future studies should measure prior knowledge on 
scientific content in order to be able to investigate whether a lack of sharing unique 
knowledge is indeed an issue for collaborative scientific reasoning about professional 
problems (Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
 A further novelty of the present study is the empirical demonstration of how the level 
of group heterogeneity regarding dyadic members’ prior knowledge on problem solving 
processes (i.e., problem solving scripts) affects the engagement of dyads in scientific 
reasoning. The results on the effect of dyadic heterogeneity with respect to dyadic members’ 






demonstrated a similar pattern as the comparison of collaborative vs individual reasoning. 
Namely, the more heterogeneous the dyads were, the more they showed the explanatory-
justification focus of collaborative reasoning: i.e., higher engagement in hypothesizing and 
evidence evaluation and lower engagement in solution generation. The more homogeneous 
the dyads were, the more they seemed to show the solution-focus that was so characteristic of 
individuals: i.e., lower engagement in hypothesizing and evidence evaluation and higher 
engagement in solution generation. These results extend the earlier findings of group 
heterogeneity (e.g., regarding expertise) on problem solving (Wiley & Jolly, 2003). The 
present work demonstrated how group heterogeneity regarding prior script-like knowledge 
(Fischer et al., 2013; Kollar et al., 2007), such as problem solving scripts, affect scientific 
reasoning processes in a problem solving context. The results, on the one hand, may indicate a 
stimulation effect (Dunbar, 1995; Paulus, 2000) of dyadic heterogeneity on the engagement in 
epistemic processes traditionally understood as being prototypical for scientific reasoning 
(Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Okada & Simon, 1997). On the other hand, these results may also be 
either partially or fully explained by an increased coordination demand between 
heterogeneous reasoning partners (Bullough et al., 2002; Rummel & Spada, 2005). Further 
analysis should reveal if knowledge co-construction (Chi & Wiley, 2014; Roschelle, 1992) is 
affected by dyadic heterogeneity and if so, how those processes might mediate the overall 
extended engagement in hypothesizing and evaluating evidence. For example, do members of 
heterogeneous dyads show a complementary effect (i.e., complete each other’s strategies) by 
exchanging different perspectives (Paulus, 2000)? Alternatively, do they engage more often in 
dialectic reasoning and challenge each other’s views (Métrailler et al., 2008; Osborne, 2010)? 
Or do they, after all, spend relatively more effort to coordinate ideas, i.e., asking for and 






 A further explanation of the negative impact of dyadic heterogeneity on the 
engagement in solution generation might be that, similarly to the discussion of the results of 
collaborative vs individual reasoning, the extended engagement in explanatory-justifying 
behavior may account for the result. This would mean that the longer reasoning partners 
engage in explaining the problem and arguing about it by evaluating evidence the less time or 
effort they need to engage in generating solutions, because they might have developed an 
elaborated understanding on the problem through extended earlier discussion. Yet, less time 
or effort might not be the best indicator of the quality of ideas. Therefore, further studies 
should test the question if an increased engagement in hypothesizing and evaluating evidence 
might indeed contribute to the “fluency” of generating solutions and also to the 
appropriateness or quality of those solutions.  
 Moreover, although the time for the overall problem solving was not fixed, i.e., 
reasoners were not stopped to talk, all participants were informed that they had about ten 
minutes for the problem solving task. This framing of available time might have resulted in a 
perception that the task needed to be fulfilled during this timeframe. As a result, those pairs 
who discussed longer explanations and evidence might have spent less time and effort on 
discussing solutions, because they may have thought they do not have much time for that or 
because they felt the task completed by their earlier discussion. Further studies should clarify 
and even systematically test the effect of (perceived) time available for the problem solving 
task on the engagement in the different epistemic processes.    
 Furthermore, the first study could not demonstrate a potential impact of dyadic 
heterogeneity on the content aspect of scientific reasoning. On the one hand, studies report a 
positive effect of group diversity on complex problem solving (Bowers et al., 2000; Canham 






(Dunbar, 1995). Other studies point to potential difficulties that heterogeneity might bring to 
exchanging ideas and solving problems in groups such as increased coordination demands 
(Bullough et al., 2002; Rummel & Spada, 2005) or collaborative inhibition of exchanging 
information (Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012). On the other hand, dyadic heterogeneity regarding 
dyadic members’ problem solving scripts did not seem to lead to neither stimulation nor 
inhibition with respect to the application of scientific content knowledge. First, it is possible, 
that there is no robust effect of dyadic heterogeneity regarding dyadic members’ problem 
solving scripts on the application of scientific content. However, it is also possible that 
potential confounds or covariates did not allow for the detection of this effect. For example, it 
is arguable that dyadic heterogeneity regarding prior knowledge on scientific content might 
explain a certain amount of variance in the application of scientific content. If future analysis 
accounts for that effect, it is possible that the effect of heterogeneity regarding problem 
solving scripts become detectable.  
 In addition, future studies should address the question to what extent dyadic 
heterogeneity regarding other frequently reported potential mediators of collaborative 
performance, i.e., internal collaboration scripts (Fischer et al., 2013; Kollar et al., 2007) 
influence the results. Studies indicate that the knowledge about how to collaborate with a 
reasoning partner (i.e., how to engage in productive discourse) might have an impact on the 
extent to which reasoning partners may engage in such discussions (Fischer et al., 2013; 
Vogel et al., 2016). The relationship between collaboration scripts which guide the social 
aspect of collaboration (Fischer et al., 2013) and problem solving scripts which guide the 
epistemic aspect of collaboration (Weinberger et al., 2005) should be clarified: first, to what 
extent they are divergent constructs, and second, whether they have any interaction effect on 






 Besides, the results that (1) prior process knowledge affected the process aspect of 
scientific reasoning and that (2) the more similar (homogeneous) group members were 
regarding their problem solving scripts the more they reasoned like one (individual) might 
also serve as an empirical argument for the validity of the problem solving script 
measurement tool in the first study which was developed to capture individual differences in 
problem solving scripts. 
 Finally, the finding that collaboration affected the process and content aspects of 
scientific reasoning in a different way suggests that scientific reasoning might not be a 
unidimensional construct and the distinction between process and content aspects can be a 
reasonable theoretical and methodological choice (Mullins et al., 2011; Rittle-Johnson et al., 
2001; Zimmerman, 2000). Accordingly, models that differentiate between the process and the 
content aspects of scientific reasoning might have more explanatory value than theories that 
do not account for the potentially multicomponental nature of scientific reasoning. 
Accordingly, scientific reasoning should be measured not as a unidimensional construct, 
rather at least on its process and on its content levels, respectively. On the other hand, further 
studies should address the question more systematically whether from these two main 
components (i.e., process and content) an integrated model of scientific reasoning can be 
developed and to further qualify the relation between those components. At the same time, 
other (quasi-)experimental studies could investigate if the two aspects of scientific reasoning 
might interact with each other at different levels of prior (process and content) knowledge or 
whether the two aspects are rather independent. For example, would low process knowledge 
and high content knowledge compared to high process knowledge and low content knowledge 
lead to similar reasoning quality and learning outcomes? In other words, to what extent does 






low prior knowledge on the other aspect? Another related question could be whether these 
two skills should be fostered separately or together?  
9.2.2. Conclusions of Study 2  
A main finding of the second study was that epistemic network analysis (ENA) was able to 
detect patterns of scientific reasoning that could meaningfully distinguish between 
collaborative and individual reasoning processes. Moreover, ENA revealed further 
information in the data that was hidden from the lenses of the traditional “coding and 
counting” approach that was applied in Study 1. Namely, ENA was able to identify 
connections between epistemic processes of scientific reasoning. To be more specific, for 
dyads evidence evaluation seemed to be the central epistemic process (i.e., making most of 
the connections with other epistemic processes), and it more often co-occurred with 
hypothesis generation as well as communicating and scrutinizing than in case of individual 
reasoning. This outcome suggests that dyads reasoned in a more evidence-based manner than 
individuals did while considering explanations of the problem and that they more often 
considered engaging in discourse with others (e.g., colleagues) in order to gain further 
information and re-evaluate available evidence. These results can indicate, for example, an 
increased need for sense-making attempts in case of collaborative problem solving, i.e., that 
reasoning partners engage in a more interactive (Chi, 2009) discussion in order to ask for as 
well as give clarifications on their hypotheses as well as considering evidence that can support 
or challenge the different explanations of the problem (Okada & Simon, 1997). These results 
seem to be in accordance with the assumption that elaborating on the ideas of the reasoning 
partner or considering engaging others in the reasoning process can also be characteristics of 
collaborative scientific reasoning (Dunbar, 1995; Okada & Simon, 1997). Interestingly, the 






the one hand, and the presence of the already mentioned connection between communication 
and scrutinizing and evidence evaluation on the other hand, indicate that when dyads took into 
consideration potential discussions with other reasoners (e.g., they pointed out the relevance 
of discussing the problem with other teachers), they may not have asked for potential 
explanations of the problem, but rather for further information in order to solve the problem in 
a more evidence-based manner (i.e., to find out the performance of the student in other 
courses). Yet, it is arguable that planned discussions with others (e.g., with colleagues) served 
the indirect aim to support or reject their initial assumptions and explanations about the 
problem by finding out evidence that can indirectly confirm or disconfirm their initial 
assumptions. Further studies might investigate whether such “epistemic chains” or 
“subnetworks” could be identified that may also reveal further information about how 
epistemic processes are organized in order to fulfill certain epistemic aims (i.e., to confirm or 
disconfirm a hypothesis).  
 Besides, the connections between evidence evaluation and non-epistemic processes 
might occur, as dyads may have more often made coordinative statements in order to keep up 
the communication or the problem solving process (Clark & Brennan, 1991), and these 
statements might have been more often evidence-related (e.g., “Have you read it through?”) 
than e.g., hypothesis-related (“Yes, it can also be that.”). It is possible that collaborative 
reasoners might have made attempts to find what their partner knew, i.e., they coordinated 
their knowledge (Rummel & Spada, 2005) with respect to the problem case information and 
for the scientific content information which both served as the available evidence for the 
study. Further studies should find out whether coordinative attempts in a group may indeed 
happen more often in the context of some epistemic processes (e.g., evidence evaluation) than 






 On the other hand, individuals connected evidence evaluation more often with 
generating solutions than dyads did. This can indicate on the one hand, that individuals were 
more evidence-based regarding their solutions than dyads were. More specifically, individuals 
might have engaged more often in conceptual simulation (Trickett & Trafton, 2007) i.e., they 
might have considered what evidence could indicate the success / failure of their planned 
solutions (interventions) regarding alleviating the problem. It is also possible that individuals 
used more often evidence in order to justify their solution plans. On the other hand, however, 
the connections might also indicate that individuals were more prone to skip an explanatory 
phase and “jump” to solutions without considering alternative hypotheses or to what extent 
their initial hypothesis is justifiable. This interpretation might be also supported by the 
connection between solution generation and hypothesis generation that can indicate that 
individuals might have coordinated more often their solutions and hypotheses than dyads did 
because of a lack of initial scrutiny of potential hypotheses about the problem. However, 
further analyses would be essential in order to confirm the interpretations of the network 
outcomes. Although ENA provides qualitative options for that purpose, a revised coding 
scheme could potentially extract sub-codes of e.g., conceptual simulation that, included in 
further models of ENA, could test between the alternative interpretations of the results of this 
dissertation.     
 All in all, the outcomes of the second study suggest that ENA is a potential 
complementary method to the merely frequency-based “coding and counting” approach. The 
results of ENA seems not only to reveal further information about the data but also to 
stimulate more hypotheses for further investigation than an exclusive application of the 






 Moreover, the finding that epistemic networks can reveal interconnected skills of 
scientific reasoning has important implications regarding how to foster scientific reasoning. 
Intervention studies, for instance, should take into account that their intervention might not 
affect merely the epistemic process they target to foster but it might affect a whole network of 
interconnected skills. For example, fostering evidence evaluation for collaborative reasoners 
might be beneficial for generating hypotheses but may not be (at least in a direct manner) 
beneficial for generating solutions. What is more, it is also possible that fostering evidence 
evaluation would be detrimental for generating solutions without fostering this latter 
epistemic process at the same time. It is also possible that in case one aims to foster scientific 
reasoning processes in general, there are certain epistemic processes or a set of processes 
which might be more effective to target than other processes. For example, those epistemic 
processes which show more extended connections (e.g., evidence evaluation) might have a 
larger impact on the overall scientific reasoning than those epistemic processes with limited or 
no connections with other processes (e.g., drawing conclusions).  
 To find out how to foster scientific reasoning, one might need, however, some expert 
model(s) of epistemic networks that should demonstrate how an optimal network should look 
like. Such expert models can then guide the development of interventions. However, 
questions would still remain. If, for example, for an expert model hypothesis generation is the 
central epistemic process while in a group of novices it makes no connections with other 
epistemic processes, how should one plan the intervention? In this case targeting hypothesis 
generation may have no effect on other epistemic processes at all. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that connections would naturally occur and the group of novices would show similar 
patterns of connections to experts over time. This leads to another implication: namely, that 






(i.e., the progress of learning to reason scientifically) in order to develop effective and 
adaptive interventions.  
 In addition, the predictive power of these networks is a further important question. It is 
possible that some patterns of connections between epistemic processes can predict better 
problem solving or other (e.g., domain-specific) learning outcomes from e.g., a problem-
based learning or inquiry context. For example, reasoners making more connections between 
the epistemic processes of questioning, hypothesizing and evaluating evidence while 
reasoning in a learning environment might demonstrate more elaborated conceptual 
development compared to reasoners who make fewer connections among these epistemic 
processes (although they may make more connections among processes). In other words, it is 
an urgent question to find out to what extent the epistemic network approach of assessing 
scientific reasoning might contribute to the preparation of future (teacher) professionals to 
solve problems as scientifically knowledgeable practitioners regarding both aspects, i.e., 
process and content, of scientific reasoning.  
9.3. General Conclusions & Implications for Measurement 
The main aim of the present work was to find out to what extent collaboration can facilitate 
the engagement of future practitioners in scientific reasoning while they are solving authentic 
problems from their future profession. Investigating this on a sample of pre-service teachers 
led to mixed results, which allows for the following general implications. 
 The present work demonstrated that first, scientific reasoning may not be a 
unidimensional construct and at least two aspects of scientific reasoning should be 
differentiated: the process and the content aspects. Second, the skills that might contribute to 
scientific reasoning might be interrelated skills. This brings several implications for the 






interventions aiming to measure and foster scientific reasoning should take into account the 
interrelated nature of skills it might be composed of. Similarly, if one aims to foster one 
epistemic process (e.g., evidence generation), one should perhaps start to consider that 
focusing on other epistemic processes (e.g., questioning or hypothesis generation) might lead 
to the same or even more positive results regarding the development of the epistemic process 
of interest (in this case, evidence evaluation). Furthermore, taken that scientific reasoning 
might be composed of a network of interrelated skills, the facilitation of any of those skills 
might lead to an overspreading activation in the network of interconnected skills. To give an 
example, this would mean that intervention on hypothesis generation might lead to the 
activation of the skills which are connected to it, such as evidence evaluation, and even to the 
activation of further skills which are not “directly” connected to it such as communicating and 
scrutinizing. Therefore, researchers should consider that their scaffolds might affect the whole 
network of interrelated skills, and they should design it accordingly instead of focusing on 
independent epistemic processes. In relation to that, in order to develop scaffolds in order to 
foster epistemic networks of scientific reasoning, epistemic networks of scientific reasoning 
should be assessed in order to understand better how the activation of one epistemic process 
may affect the activation of the whole network of interconnected skills so as to develop 
interventions accordingly. Yet, it should also be modelled how such activation of the initial 
networks might predict later development within the network as a result of scaffolding and 
whether there is an optimal pattern of networks that the scaffolding should target to intervene 
on. To be more concrete, it might be one possibility that in case of dyads show the problem of 
connecting evidence with solutions, then scaffolds targeting evidence evaluation and solution 
generation at the same time would lead to the development of their epistemic networks, i.e., 






beyond: leading to more dense networks where, to give an example, drawing conclusions 
would also become more visible among the interconnected processes. 
9.4. Limitations 
The main question of the dissertation, whether a collaborative context for problem solving 
might improve the engagement of future professionals in scientific reasoning, can be 
answered by the two above reported studies, yet, only to a limited extent. In order to see the 
explanatory strength of the empirical studies presented in this dissertation (Chapter 8-9) for 
answering the main question, in the followings, these limitations are addressed. 
 First, there seems to be an important limitation for generalizability. Although the 
question of this dissertation is concerned with scientific reasoning of future practitioners, the 
empirical studies investigated scientific reasoning only in the domain or field of teaching. It is 
important to note, that without gaining additional empirical knowledge on how future 
professionals with other professional background engage in scientific reasoning as a result of 
collaboration, it is difficult to generalize to other fields of practitioners (e.g., medical 
professionals). Furthermore, “practitioners” are probably not a homogeneous category: while 
there might be domain-general characteristics of scientific reasoning, different fields of 
practice might vary in the extent and strategy they rely on scientific reasoning during solving 
problems in their field (Ericsson, 2006; Gilhooly, 1990). Yet, it is important to mention here 
that those domain-specific differences emerge with expertise (Ericsson, 2006) and thus, 
scientific reasoning of novices from different domains might not show such differences. More 
empirical research in this area targeting a diversity of domains or fields of practice would 
contribute to a better understanding on how practitioners reason in different domains, what 






more evidence-based understanding in this respect, it would be easier to draw conclusions 
regarding the effect and plan for interventions such as implementing collaboration. 
 It is noteworthy to add to the generalizability concern that the presented empirical 
study implemented only one problem case for the problem solving task. In order to estimate 
the non-task dependent but general scientific reasoning skills of future professionals, future 
study designs should consider the application of multiple problem solving tasks. In case the 
results of the present study could be replicated in other problem solving contexts, that could 
serve as an argument for the external validity (i.e., generalizability) of the present findings.  
 A further external validity indicator could be if future studies could address more 
ecologically valid problem solving scenarios. To be more specific, while the research 
presented in this dissertation was conducted in a laboratory setting, it is important to 
investigate pre-service teachers problem solving in more authentic (e.g., classroom) settings. 
By analyzing scientific reasoning of pre-service teachers solving problems stemming from 
their own teaching experiences would allow us to draw more ecologically valid inferences 
regarding scientific reasoning and would have the potential of developing more authentic 
interventions that might require minimal transfer and may result in more effective learning of 
scientific reasoning skills (e.g., Brown et al., 1989).   
 A second limitation comes at the interpretation of the results. Most importantly, 
assessing the quality of scientific reasoning beyond engaging in certain epistemic processes or 
making reference to scientific content, would be necessary in order to draw concise 
conclusions regarding the effect of collaboration on scientific reasoning. One potential way to 
analyze it could be to perhaps combine the process and content aspects and count to what 
extent the engagement in an epistemic process may contain scientific content reference. As 






raise its validity as discussed in the conclusions (in section 10.2.1). To give an example, 
groups’ increased engagement in hypothesizing might represent process losses or process 
gains (Hill, 1982; Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012; Nokes-Malach, et al., 2015), but further analysis 
should reveal if the increased agreement represents inappropriate explanations as an outcome 
of a necessary coordination process within groups (process loss) or it is a result of adequate 
and high-quality argumentation, i.e., more challenges and justifications of ideas (process 
gain). Although the results of the second study, i.e. the more frequent connections between 
hypothesizing and evaluating evidence in case of dyads, point to the direction of the latter 
interpretation (i.e., process gain); without a more explicit operationalization and further 
measurement on the quality of scientific reasoning it is possible only to a limited extent to 
draw valid conclusions about whether future professionals reason better in groups than alone.  
 A third limitation is the lack of a prior knowledge measure that would account for 
prior content knowledge. Although prior knowledge on the process aspect of scientific 
reasoning was assessed in order to predict reasoning performance (i.e., engagement in 
epistemic processes), an analogous measurement of prior content knowledge (i.e., about 
theories and research in the learning sciences) poses limitation for the interpretation of the 
results regarding the application of scientific content. For example, groups’ lower 
proportional engagement in referring to scientific content can be explained as a lack of 
knowledge sharing attempts (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Yet, having data on what reasoners knew 
before they started to reason, would be one way to assess to what extent they shared their 
knowledge within the group. The importance of this question is visible when one plans an 
intervention to facilitate scientific reasoning in groups: shall groups receive scaffolds that 
target knowledge-sharing processes? Further empirical findings are necessary to further 






 Finally, when explaining the results, it is important to consider that several factors can 
moderate the effect of collaboration on scientific reasoning. One of those, namely dyadic 
heterogeneity regarding problem solving scripts, was explicitly addressed in this work. Yet, 
studies show that further factors such as collaboration skills (i.e., internal collaboration 
scripts; Fischer et al., 2013) as well as cognitive load (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2011) may 
account for the extent to which collaborative partners engage in productive discussion. These 
moderators may also influence the extent to which dyadic heterogeneity regarding problem 
solving scripts can explain scientific reasoning. For example, heterogeneous dyads might face 
more coordination demands to develop a mutual understanding on the problem, and this might 
impose more cognitive load on dyadic members which might not allow them to benefit from a 
collaborative discourse. On the other hand, coordination demands stemming from dyadic 
heterogeneity might be minimized in the presence of strong collaborative skills. Such 
interaction or moderation effects should be enlightened by further empirical investigations.  
9.5. Practical Implications 
The findings of this dissertation indicated that implementing collaboration can be beneficial if 
the aim is to engage future professionals in a more reflective and scrutinized understanding of 
the nature of the problem (i.e., developing hypotheses and connecting those with evidence). 
At the same time, it might be necessary to scaffold future practitioners to apply scientific 
evidence from their domain, because engaging them in collaboration with minimal instruction 
does not have a positive effect on applying scientific content. These scaffolds could 
potentially target sharing unique knowledge with each other while solving the problem as well 
as regulating coordination and sense-making processes at an early phase of problem solving 






 Furthermore, it seems that this reflective understanding of the nature of the problem 
can further benefit from group heterogeneity. Therefore, when planning for a collaborating 
problem solving session (e.g., initiating problem based learning) it seems to be a reasonable 
idea to pair collaborating partners who to an extent disagree with each other on how to 
progress with the problem solving itself. Such disagreements, according to the present 
empirical work, seemed to stimulate a more investigative discussion about the problem. 
However, another implication of the presented findings is that disagreeing partners may 
require further scaffolding to regulate coordination processes as well.    
 On the other hand, if the aim is to support practitioners to reason about how to solve 
the problem instead of explaining it, individual reasoning might be more appropriate than 
reasoning in groups. Yet, individuals might need to be supported to re-evaluate their initial 
interpretations of the problem by considering alternative explanations for it in the light of 
evidence.  
 All in all, collaboration might be beneficial for engaging future professionals in 
reasoning as scientifically knowledgeable practitioners, but further instructional support for 
sharing ideas, coordinating views and initiating solutions seem to be necessary to optimize 
collaborative problem solving. The type and level of instructional support should be further 
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I. Problem Case 
Stellen Sie sich bitte die folgende Situation vor - wie würden Sie als Lehrer/in handeln, 
um diese Problemsituation zu beheben? 
Sie sind Lehrer/in an einer Schule. Eine Ihrer Schülerinnen erhält oft vergleichsweise 
schlechte Noten auf ihre Prüfungen. Allerdings erscheint sie im Unterricht sehr motiviert und 
vermittelt den Eindruck, dass sie fast alle Lerninhalte versteht. Von ihren Eltern wissen sie, 
dass die Schülerin zu Hause sehr fleißig lernt. Wenn es allerdings zur Prüfung kommt, hat sie 
allerdings große Schwierigkeiten, das Gelernte abzurufen. Sie als Lehrer/n sollen nun 























II. Segmentation Scheme 
a) Grain size 
We decided to keep our segmentation relatively fine grain-sized so as to grab the minimum 
meaningful pieces of information and to follow a micro-level segmentation approach 
(Weinberger & Fischer, 2006). We chose syntactical unit as the basis of our analysis. Segment 
borders can be identified by separating propositional units (Chi, 1997, p. 9.) defined by the 
following rules.  
b) Segmentation rules 
Segments should be separated by using “//” in the end of each segments. 
1. The basic form of a proposition is a full sentence that includes a subject and a 
statement/verb and is indicated by punctuation signs “.” or “?” 
2. Complex or compound sentences should be divided into “simple sentences”, taking 
into account the following rules: 
2.1.Everywhere where a comma could be set, a new segment starts, at least if 
the new sentence part includes a verb. 
2.2.Words like "und", "aber", "oder" typically indicate a new segment, at least 
if the new and the previous sentence parts contain a verb each. 
 
Example 1:  
A: Ok, also wir haben hier die Schülerin, // 
die zwar wohl sehr fleißig lernt // 
und auch den Eindruck erweckt, // 
dass sie alles versteht // 
was im Unterricht behandelt wird.// 
 
Exception 1: 
"oder so", "klar und offen", "und ding", "weiß ich nicht" (Umgangsprache), 
"…oder nicht" 
 
2.3.Conditional and other forms of "Nebensatz”-sentences should be handled 
as compound sentences. Words like "wenn", "ob", "dass", "wann", "wo", 
"was", "wie", "wer" typically indicate a new segment, at least if the new 
sentence part contains either a new verb or a new subject or both.  
 
Example 1: 
A: Das ist ja eine anerkannte, ähm, Krankheit, // 
oder ja, eine eine Angst (ein unverständliches Wort) // 
oder dass man das halt, ich glaube da man sogar dagegen trainieren oder 







Exception 1: When "dass" is used without the grammatical value of 
binding Hauptsatz-Nebensatz.  
Example to Exception 1:  
A: Aber einfach mal, dass ich mal sehe halt // 
Exception 2: Words like "wenn", "ob", "dass", "wann", "wo", "was", 
"wie", "wer" do not indicate a new segment when they follow an 
introductory sentence part that expresses a thought, feeling, idea (see rule 
4) with phrases like "Er sagte mir, was…” etc.  
 
Exception 3: Simple exemplifying, typically indicated by “z.B.” should not 
be coded as a new segment.  
Example to Exception 3:  
Genau, man sollte halt eher sich so Eselsbrücken bilden wie jetzt z.B. 
die Organisationsstrategie? // 
3. "ähm", “na ja” within a running sentence should not be coded as a segment on its own.  
4. Phrases like "glaube ich", "ich denke", “das heißt”, “sie weiß”, "es könnte sein",  
"keine Ahnung", "er sagt", "sie bestätigt", "sie merkt", "das erinnert mich" etc. in a 
sentence should not be treated as independent segments. 
4.1.Similarly, forms like "das liegt daran", "das hängt davon", "es kommt 
darauf an", "es wäre gut", "es gibt eine Möglichkeit"   as introductory 
phrases should not be segmented separately.   
5. "ja", "genau" or other forms of back channeling, self-reflecting typically should not be 
coded as different segments. The following rules should apply:  
5.1.Simple backchannels from the learning partner while the other one is 
speaking should just be ignored (not coded nor segmented).  
 
Example 1:  
A: Dass sie dann Verlustängste hat...//  
B: Ja. 
A: ... wenn es auf den Punkt kommt//  
 
5.2.When "ja" or “genau" can be considered as backchannels or express 
agreement and at the same time they are followed by a thought from the 
same speaker, they should be coded together with the following segment.  
Example 1:  






Example 2:  
  A: Mhm… genau… Sie lernt ja glaube ich auch sehr viel und fleißig…// 
 
5.3.Similarly, self-reflective use of "genau”, “ja” etc. within a running sentence 
should not be coded as independent segments. 
 
Example 1:  
A: Ja, vor allem es steht ja hier nicht, // 
dass sie immer, sondern nur vergleichsweise schlechte Noten, also oft,  also, 
aber, ähm… ja was, genau.// 
 
6. Repetitions of words or sentence parts should belong to the same segment. 
 
Example 1: 
A: Das scheint ja auch so… uhm, es scheint ja auch so, // 
 
7. Every new turn except backchannels (Rule 5) should be coded as a new segment 
regardless how long it is.  
8. When no rules from above can apply to separate sentence parts from one another, they 
should not be divided into separate segments but handled as one. 
Additional rules:  
9. Sometimes a syntactical structure is interrupted by a parenthetical segment. If the 
parenthetical qualifies as a full segment, we should segment it separately from the 
interrupted syntactical structure.  
 
Moreover, if the interrupted structure qualifies on its own (without the parenthetical) as a 
full segment, we should segment both the part before and after the parenthetical structure, 
separately. 
 
Still, in an additional comment "[s+-x]" we should make it clear that the separated pieces 
of the interrupted segment belong together, and they should be handled as one segment. In 
the comment  "[s+-x]" x represents the number of steps (+ or -) where the corresponding 
segment part occurs. Consequently, [s+2] means that the corresponding segment part is a 
subsequent one, in a two-step distance from the actual segment part, while [s-2] means, 
the corresponding segment part precedes with 2 steps the current segment part. 
 
Example 1:  
B.: Und da haben halt, // [s+2] 
je nachdem wie alt das Kind ist halt, //  






III. Coding scheme 
a) Relationship between segments and codes 
Since our choice was a relatively small segment size, it is possible that one code can be 
assigned throughout multiple segments. In this case all the segments can be considered under 
one code if they are a continuation of the first segment where the same code was assigned (see 
Example 1 for instance).  
b) Epistemic activities of scientific reasoning 
The epistemic activities of scientific reasoning are suggested by Fischer et al. (2014) as they 
intend to comprehensively enough cover those actions a reasoner might take during scientific 
reasoning. Our coding scheme targets the question how and to what extent these activities can 
describe teacher students’ scientific reasoning during solving a practice-related task.  
1. Problem identification (PI) 
Criteria:  
PI should be coded in case of a reference to the problem description that expresses 
a) An attempt to build an understanding of the problem described 
b) An actual understanding of the problem (like summarizing the problem description) 
and it should precede further inquiry. Therefore, PI has a sequential characteristic, typically 
occurring in the beginning of scientific reasoning.  
Clarification: 
This epistemic activity is related to "Construction of problem space" in the Weinberger & 
Fischer (2006) coding scheme: during PI participants deal with the available case information 
in the task description with the epistemic aim to build a problem representation. They do so, 
so as to identify how to direct their further inquiry. Participants notice that the problem cannot 
be answered without further inquiry. To reach the epistemic aim of understanding the problem 
better, participants might:  
1. read the case information (task description) out loud 
2. connect case information with case information within the task description  
3. reflect on the case information (rephrase, interpret, ask questions on the case information) 
It is also possible, that participants make generalizations on the case information (similarly to 










„Ok, also wir haben hier die Schülerin, // 
die zwar wohl sehr fleißig lernt // 
und auch den Eindruck erweckt // 
dass sie alles versteht // 
was im Unterricht behandelt wird. // 
Allerdings, uhm, kann sie dann in den Prüfungen das Gelernte nicht abrufen //“ 
 
Rule 1: Reference to the task description in the very beginning of the transcript is typically 
coded under PI while later references are always considered under EG or EE as case evidence. 
So PI should almost always be coded in the beginning but never afterwards. 
 
2. Questioning (Q) 
Criteria: 
This epistemic activity is orienting further inquiry by focusing the interest on a main question 
that should be answered in order to solve the problem. It is notable that Q does not have to 
have a question format (see Example 3). 
Clarification: 
It is an initial question coming from the original problem (described in the problem scenario 
and might be explicitly referred during PI) and it directs subsequent reasoning processes. It 
comes from the situation where the problem exists and it targets further information collection 
/ analysis / discussion etc. 
This epistemic activity might - although not necessarily - follow problem identification. 
“Based on the representation developed during problem identification, one or more initial 
questions are identified for the subsequent reasoning process.” (Fischer et al, 2014., p...)  
Examples: 
Example 2. 
“O.k., warum ist sie so schlecht in den Prüfungen? //“ 
Example 3. 
A: „Ähm, ich glaub wir sollen da jetzt eine Lösung dazu finden.// 
B: Dass sich praktisch die Prüfungsleistungen verbessern, //  
oder.. ne, mögliche Gründe eher.//  
A: Also mögliche Gründe... 
B: mhm 
A: ...wieso sie quasi die, ähm, Leistung die sie im Unterricht eben nicht abrufen kann. //“ 
 
Rule 1: Just like PI, Q is typically coded in the very beginning in the transcript. In contrast to 
PI, it is possible to code Q later but only if it leads to further inquiry.  







It is a plausible (and ideally testable) explanation of the problem, and it should be a plausible 
answer to Q, although it does not matter if PI or Q is explicitly stated by the participant or not.   
Clarification: 
During this epistemic activity participants normally “derive possible answers to the question 
from plausible models, available theoretical frameworks or empirical evidence they are aware 
of” (Fischer et al. 2014, p...). It can come from theories that can give plausible answers: for 
instance, "Lernstrategie" as explaining "Prüfungsproblem". However, it does not have to be 
scientific. Therefore, any possible explanation of the problem can qualify as HG. 
Examples: 
Example 4.  
"A: […] Oder, wie du schon gesagt hast, Prüfungsangst…//  
[reden durcheinander] 
B.: Ja, also entweder es ist halt Prüfungsangst, // 
dass sie es halt eigentlich kann // 
aber dann  
A.: Genau 
B.: so gestresst ist 
A.: Ja 
B.: in der Prüfung, //" 
 
Example 5. 
"Oder vielleicht lernt sie’s….vielleicht hat sie auch die falsche Lernstrategie. //" 
Example 6. 
"Ja, vielleicht kann sie auch einfach nicht das, was sie lernt, // 
mit anderen Sachen verknüpfen. //" 
Rule 1: Hypothesis should not be confused with hypothetical EG or hypothetical EE. A 
hypothesis is always a possible reason of the student’s problem. A hypothetical evidence is 
typically a “what if” evidence that could happen in a hypothetical scenario but it does not 
serve as a possible reason for the student’s problem.  
 
4. Construction and redesign of artefacts (CA) 
Criteria: 
We consider artefact as an intervention / solution plan. This intervention plan can be formed 
as a solution to the original problem or they my aim changing the context of the problem to 







The artefact is typically a plan for revision of the context where the problem occurred so as to 
prevent the problem or to solve it. It can be: 
 
- teaching methods 
- curriculum design 
- testing methods 
- other intervention plan where an artefact (e.g. training session) can be identified (see 
Example 6.) 
 
CA differs from HG, because it does not only say a plausible solution but the epistemic aim is 





"Vielleicht kann man auch noch irgendwie externe Ressourcen einbringen, wie z.B. ..ja, 
Nachhilfe, //" 
 
5. Evidence generation (EG) 
Criteria: 
This epistemic activity should be coded when participants use any available information or 
generate new (e.g. hypothetical) information that could help in solving the problem or 
answering the question.  
Clarification: 
We consider evidence as any form of information taken into account with the aim to support 
or to reject a claim or to make more reliable decisions. 
Typical types of evidence:   
1. Case information written in the problem statement  
2. Scientific content information on the Folien 
3. Scientific content information other 
4. Nonscientific, anecdotal information (personal experience) retrieved from memory 
5. Hypothetical information ("what if") 
 
We consider hypothetical evidence as a valid form of "scientific" evidence in the process of 
"what if" reasoning or "conceptual simulation": as Trickett & Trafton (2007) claims (p. 844) 
that in case of informational uncertainty when for instance data is missing, scientists can 
generate it by thinking of alternatives. The authors consider it as a valid form of reasoning 








“Aber die Sache ist ja hier, hier steht ja, // 
dass sie fast alle Lerninhalte versteht. //“ (EG type 1.) 
 
Example 8. 
“Aber dann würde sie sich am Unterricht nicht so beteiligen // 
und dann würde der Lehrer nicht sagen sie kann’s. //“ (EG type 5.) 
 
Example 9. 
“ob’s in den anderen Fächern auch so ist.//“ (EG type 5.) 
 
Rule 1: When evidence is used with evaluative purpose, it should always be coded under EE 
with a reference to what type of evidence it is (scientific, case, anecdotal, hypothetical). 
 
Rule 2: When a segment cannot be coded under any types of the evidences above, it is not 
considered evidence and should not be coded as EG or EE.  
 
6. Evidence evaluation (EE) 
Criteria: 
Participants deal with the evaluation of available or generated information; or with the 
hypothesis. 
Clarification: 
This epistemic activity typically represents the phase of inquiry that deals with the 
relationship between a claim (hypothesis, theory, model, initial question) and any available or 
generated information. According to Sandoval et al (2014) "both the claim itself must be 
evaluated, and evidence is evaluated in relation to the claim." (p 141.). However, our 
interpretation is wider than that: we suggest that any evaluation of a claim or evidence 
regarding to its reliability or validity can also be considered under EE. 
1. Participants evaluate evidence if it supports or falsify claims or any pre-existing ideas 
(theories, hypotheses, initial questions).  
2. Participants evaluate a claim whether it can be kept or needs to be revised. Typically 
hypothesis falsification (even without a reference to the evidence). (See Example 10.) 
3. Participants evaluate the reliability of the evidence or its source.  
4. Participants deal with the validity (typically contextual nature) of the problem, evidence or 
a hypothesis (Example 11).  









„Steht ja, glaube ich, da irgendwo, // 
dass das nicht da drauf ankommt, dass man es lernt //“ 
 
Example 11. 
„Ja, das ist ja bei einer bestimmten Situation so“ 
 
Rule 1: EE should only be coded in case of one of the 5 types described above. If the segment 
cannot be coded under these, that is either another activity or non-epistemic.  
 
7. Drawing conclusion (DC) 
Criteria:  
Participants make conclusive statements regarding the inquiry process, e.g., to summarize. 
Clarification: 
What follows from the results? Can we say anything, plan intervention etc? This activity is 
more conclusive than EE (does not deal only with the quality of evidence) or HG (it is not 
"only" an answer to Q). It deals with the outcomes of the reasoning process, the summary and 
further plans maybe. 
Examples: 
Rule 1: DC is always summative. It typically has sequential characteristic to happen in the 
end of the reasoning cycle where participants summarize their findings.  
Rule 2: It can happen not at the end of the transcript, but earlier, in case participants finish 
thinking about the reasons of the problem and start with the solutions. Still, it has to be at least 
a brief summary of the previous ideas. 
8. Communicating and scrutinizing (CS) 
Criteria: 
This epistemic activity is coded when participants plan to engage in communication with the 
aim of developing scientific inquiry, regardless of what stage of it. 
Clarification: 
Communicating might happen in order to generate evidence, evaluate evidence or hypothesis, 
construct artefacts, draw conclusions and so on. The main criteria is the plan to involve others 







“Vielleicht könnte man da mit der Schülerin dann einfach drüber reden //“ 
 
“Vielleicht sollen wir auch mit anderen Lehrern diskutieren. //“ 
 
Rule 1: CS should be coded only if there is a plan to communicate and to develop scientific 
reasoning at the same time. If the plan is only to talk without the aim to collect evidence, 
develop intervention and so on, then it should not be coded as CS.  
 
 
